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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Reporter's Transcript taken May 8, 2007, will be lodged with the Supreme Court. 
Claimant's Exhibits: 
A. All medical records submitted by Defendants 
B. Supplemental medical records from Curt G. Kurtz, M.D. 
e. Summary of medical services rendered from Curt G. Kurtz, M.D. 
D. Prescriptions of Claimant 
E. Claimant's income tax returns for 1999,2000 and 2001 
Defendants' Exhibits: 
A. Medical Records of Curt G. Kurtz, M.D. 
B. Medical Records of Benefits Healthcare 
e. Medical Records of J. D. Schumpert, M.D. 
D. Medical Records of Jeffrey R. Kessler, M.D. 
E. Medical Records of Michael A. Dube, M.D. 
F. Medical Records of Great Falls Clinic Surgery Center 
G. Medical Records of Michael A. Sousa, M.D. and Henry H. Gary, M.D. 
H. Medical Records of Gorsuch, M.D. 
I. Medical Records of Richard A. Day, M.D. 
J. Medical Records of Wood River Medical Center ER 
Additional Documents: 
1. Deposition of Curt G. Kurtz, M.D., taken April 13, 2004 
2. Deposition of Henry H. Gary, M.D., taken April 14, 2004 
3. Deposition of Michael A. Sousa, M.D., taken April 14, 2004 
4. Deposition of Curt G. Kurtz, M.D., taken July 11, 2007 
5. Deposition of Jim Deming, Ed.D., taken July 11, 2007 
6. Deposition of Roy Tyler Frizzell, M.D., taken July 26,2007 
7. Deposition of Douglas Crum, CDMS, taken February 12, 2008 
8. Claimant's Opening Brief, dated June 25, 2004 
9. Defendants' Posthearing Brief, dated July 19, 2004 
10. Claimant's Reply Brief, dated August 4,2004 
11. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, filed October 15, 2004 
12. Order, filed October 15,2004 
13. Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration, dated November 3,2004 
14. Order Denying Reconsideration, filed December 3,2004 
15. Appellant's Opening Brief filed in Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 31509, dated June 9, 2005 
16. Respondents' Brief filed in Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 31509, filed July 25,2005 
17. Appellant's Reply Brief filed in Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 31509, dated August 23,2005 
not lodged with Industrial Commission, not available 
18. Idaho Supreme Court Opinion No. 26, dated March 20, 2006 
19. Claimant's Opening Brief, dated May 7,2008 
20. Defendants' Posthearing Brief, filed June 11,2008 
21. Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Posthearing Brief, dated July 11, 2008 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATI 
COMPLAINT 
CL;:.u,u."r·s ,,/.ME ANa AOORESS 
V _ J. Magee 
P.O. Box 215 
Cascade, MT 59421 
EMPLOYER'S NAME ,l.NO ADDRESS 
Thompson Creek Mining Company 
P. O. Box 62 
Clayton, ID 83227 
CL"",IMANiS SOCIAL SeCURITY NO. CLAIMANrs BIRTHDA n: 
 
 
STA r£ :'NO COUNl'Y IN WHICH INJURY OCCURAED 
Idaho, Custer County 
Cl.AIMANrS ATTORNIiY"S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Emil F. Pike, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
WORIC:ERS' COMPOISA TlON INSURANCE C':'RRIER'S INOT ,l.OJUSTOR·SI NAME 
ANa AODRESS 
Ace Fire Underwriters Ins. Co. 
P.O. Box 707 
New Meadows, ID 83654 
DAn: DF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
5/6/00 
WHEN INJURED. CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE 
OF:' 840.00. PURSUANT TO 172-419. IDAHO COOE 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL OISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPl:NEOI 
Missed step on a stairway. 
NA ruRE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALUGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
Injury to lumbar spine affecting use of right leg and foot. 
WHATWORIC:ERS' COMPENS,\TION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME? Compensation for medical expense, 
temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial impairment, permanent 
partial disability and/or total and permanent disability. 
0'\ r£ ON .... 'HICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GTVEN TO EMPlOYER TO WHOM YOU GAVE NOTICE 
5/6/00 Management 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN~ fi ORAL • o WRITTEN o OTHER. PlEASE SPECIFY 
ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOL VEO 
Claimant's entitlement to the following worker's compensation ~~ 
benefits: medical care; permanent partial impatrment; ?errnanen~3partial 
disability; total and permanent disability. 
(:5 
00 YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPlICA TEO SET OF FACTS? ~x.-ES 0 NQ~~5 IF SO.<MASE STAn: WHY. 
Claim presents c&mpli~ated set 
of facts. 
NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AOAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE FILED ON FORM I.C. 1002 
(COMPl.ETE OTHER SIDE) CompLaint-Pagco I of :: 
.:1-
F'H' SICII.I;S WHO !'REArED C1..AIMAHf IH.-ME AHO ADORESS, 
Curt G. Kurtz, M.D., 300 N. Wilson, Block 502 East, Bozeman, MT 59715; 
Michael A. Sousa, M.D., Henry H. Gary, M.D., and Richard A. Day, M.D., 
2835 Fort Missoula Road, Missoula, MT 59804. 
W .... T MEDlCA.L COSTS HAVE YOU INCUAA£D TO 01. TEl 
Employer has paid substantial medical costs. 
WHA T MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPlOYER PAEO. IF ANY? .; WHAT !.AEDlCAl COSTS HA'It YOU PAlO. ~ ANY? • 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEOlA TING THIS CLAIM. IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. £a YES o NO 
OATE SI,~E OF CU~T °r~7 / I J:~. /2; 2r,?cJ-;). , '--I-~' / 
- .. : 
PlEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIO~MEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR . TH BENEFITS 
NAME OF DECEASED DATE OF DEAnt FlELAnON OF DECEASED TO CLAIMANT 
WI. S ClAl!.AANT DEPENDENT ON OECEASEDl I 010 Cl.AIMANT LNE Wlnt DECEASED A.T TI!.AE OF ACClOENT7 
DYES ONO o YES 0 NO 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE. SIGN AND OATE THE FOLLO\NING: 
MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
I hereby authorize any defendant and defendants' legal counsel, at their sole expense, to examine, inspect, receive or tak.e copies 
of any medical reports, records, x-rays or test results of hospitals, physicians or any other person, or to receive information from any person 
~avinQ examined me and their diagnosis. relative to my past. present and future physical and mental condition. 
I also authorize- and direct that a dt;plicate set of all documents or wrinen records' provided to said law firm. or any individual 
member thereof, also be provided to me or my attorney, Emi 1 F. Pike, Jr. . The defendant reauestlng 
my records shall bear the expense incurred in prOduction of such duplicate set. 
I further authorize that copies of this authorization may be used in lieu of the original. THIS AUTHORIZATION IS VALID ONLY FOR 
THE DURATION OF THE PENDING LITIGATION. It is further understood that all information obtained under thiS authonzation shall be 
re';iarce~ as confidential and maincatned as such. 
Dated tnis _ day of 20 
-----------------, -
Claimant's Signature 
NO TICE! An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer an Form I.C. 
1003 with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of 
maifing to avoid default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained. from: Industrial Commission. Judicial Division, 317 Main Street. 
Soise. Idaho 83720-6000 (2081 334-6000 
{COMPLETE CERT/FICA TE OF SERVICE ON PAGE JJ 
PlEASE COMPLETE 
CERTIFICATe OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ...L2.. day of <K'f4l1'114.&n 4: .2Q::)....l. I caused to 
be slUVed a true and correct copy of tne foregOIng Complaint uQon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Thompson Creek Mining Co. Ace Fire Underwriters Ins. Co. 
P.O. Box 62 
Clayton, ID 83227 
via: o personal service of process 
12k regular U.S. MaiJ 
P.O. Box 707 
New Meadows, ID 83654 
via: 0 personal slUVice of process 
xli] regular U.S. Mail 
o I have not served a copy of tne Complaint on anyone. 
Complaint-Page J o( J 
'3 
Send Original To: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83720-6000 lCI003 (Rev. 11191) 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
V. J. Ma~ee 
PO Box 15 
Cascade, MT 59421 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
I.e. NO. 00-020426 
(DOl: 05-06-00) 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Emil F. Pike, Jr., Esq. 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE ~ (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME A.;'<D 
ADDRESS 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING COMPANY 
PO Box 62 ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
Clayton, ID 83227 PO Box 707 
New Meadow, ID 83654 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND ADDRESS) ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRlAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND 
ADDRESS) 
Glenna M. Christensen, ISB No. 2333 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK N/A 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
POBox 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
\1\ 208/345-2000 208/385-5384 (fax) gmc@moffatt.com 
Co:. r ~ 
The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
IT IS: (Check One) 
Admitted Denied 
V 
V 
V 
V 
N/A 
V 
N/A 
V 
V 
: "1 
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actuall~ccurred on or 
about the time claimed. " - -
2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly V entirely by an 
accident out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the 
nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of 
and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment. 
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to 
the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the 
manifestation of such occupational disease. 
7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five 
months after the employment had ceased m which it is claimed the disease was contracted. 
8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 72-419: $ 
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissible self-insured under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? 
Those paid. 
(Continued) 
Answer - Page 1 of 2 801 MTl :425085.1 
11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affinnative defenses. 
I 
Whether claimant is in need of additional medical treatment causally related to the accident of May 6, 
2000. 
II 
Whether claimant has disability in excess of impairment. 
III 
Wheth.er the claimant's disability is due in part to preexisting conditions or injury and, if so, the 
apportIOnment thereof. 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. 
A copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all partIes or their attorneys by regular 
U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless 'ou deny liability, you should ~ay immedIately the compensation required by 
law, and not cause the claimant, as well as voursel , the expense of a hearing. A.l compensation which is concededly due and 
acclUed should be paid. Payments due shoufd not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule III(D), Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund must be filed on Form I.e. 1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. DYES 181 NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLlCA TED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
No. 
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date Dated Signature of Defendant or Attorney 
PPD TTD Medical ~#~ $12,952.50 $31,846.45 $39,401.28 January 2,2003 /' ~ Glenna M. Christensen 
/ IJ (/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of January, 2003, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Answer upon: 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
Emil F. Pike, Jr., Esq. 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
via: personal service of process 
.I regular U.S. Mail 
Answer - Page 2 of 2 
via: 
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND (if applicable) 
via: personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
5 
BOI_MT1 :425085.1 
Claimant's Name & Address 
V.J. Magee 
117 Mill Street 
Toston, MT 59643 
Employer's Name & Address 
Thompson Creek Mining Company 
P.O. BOX 62 
Clayton, ID 83227 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT 
Claimant's Attorney's Name & Address 
Emil F. Pike, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier's 
(Not Adjustor's) Name & Address 
Ace Fire Underwriters 
P.O. Box 707 
New Meadows, ID 83654 
Claimant's SSN 
 
Claimant's Birth Date 
 
Date of InjurylManifestation of Occupational Disease 
05/06/2000 
State & County in Which Injury O When Injured, Claimant was Earning an 
State of Idaho, County of Custer 
Average Weekly Wage of $840.00, pursuant to §72-419, 
Idaho Code 
Descnbe How Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (What Happened) 
Claimant missed step on a stairway causing injury to his back and legs. 
Nature of Medical Problems Alleged As a Result of Accident or Occupational Disease 
Injury to lumbar spine ~dversely affecting use of Claimant's legs and ability to walk. 
What Workers' Compensation Benefits are You Claiming at This Time? 
1. Compensation for medical expenses; 
2. Authorization for future medical expenses 
3. temporary total disability benefits; 
4. Permanent partial impairment benefits; ::;:~ 
5. Permanent partial di:mbility and/or total and permanent disability benefits. r-~ 
To Whom You GaveNcrtice 
w 
Date on Which Notice of Injury was Given to Employer 
May 6,2000 Management fri 9 
How Notice Was Given: (X) Oral ( ) Written ( ) Other, Please Specify ~ r 
Issue or Issues Involved: 
1. Whether Claimant has sustained a change in condition, as provided for by I.C. §72-719. 
2. Whether Claimant is entitled to past and future medical care, including an MRI, as provided for by 
I.e. § 72-432(1). 
3. Whether the Industrial Commission should re-open Claimant's case and increase benefits pursuant to 
§ 72-719(3) (Manifest~ Injustice). 
Do You Believe This Claim Presents a New Question of Law Or a Complicated Set of Facts? (X )Yes ( ) No 
If so Please state why. 
Notice: Complaints Against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund Must Be Filed On Form I.e. 1002 
Complaint - Page - 1 G 
Physicians Who Treated Claimant (Name & Address) 
Physicians: Curt G. Kurtz, M.D., 8707 N. Jackrabbit, Ste. C, Belgrade, MT 59714; Michael A. Sousa, 
M.D., Henry H. Gary, M.D. and Richard A. Day, M.D., 2835 Fort Missoula Road, Missoula, MT 59804. 
What Medical Costs Have You Incurred To Date? Claimant has incurred medical costs subsequent to the time of the 
Industrial Commission's Order in this case. Claimant is in need offurther and additional medical care, including 
authorization for an MRI. 
What Medical Costs Has Your Employer Paid? If any? $ ___ _ 
What Medical Costs Have You Paid, If any? 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES ~GREE." ( ) Yes () No 
Please Answer The set Of Questions Immediately Below Only If Claim Is Made F 
Name of Deceased I Date of Death Relation Of Decease To Claimant 
Was Claimant Dependent On Deceased? 
( ) Yes () No 
Claimant Must Complete, Sign & Date The Following: 
Did Claimant Live With Deceased At Time Of Accident? 
( ) Yes () No 
Medical Release Form 
I hereby authorized any defendant and defendants' legal counsel, at their sole expense, to examine, inspect, 
receive or take copies of any medical reports, records, x-rays or test results of hospitals, physicians or any other person, or 
to receive information from any person having examined me and their diagnosis, relative to my past, present and future 
physical and mental condition. 
I also authorized and direct that a duplicate set of all documents or written records provided to said law firm, or 
any individual member thereof, also be provided to me or my attorney, Emil F. Pike, Jr. The defendant requesting my 
records shall bear the expense incurred in production of such duplicate set. 
I further authorize that copies of this authorization may be used in lieu of the original. THIS AUTHORIZATION 
IS V ALID ONLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE PENDING LITIGATION. It is further understood that all 
information obtained under this authorization shall be regarded as confidential and maintained as such. 
Dated this __ day 2005. 
Claimant's Signature 
NOTICE! An employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form I.C. 1003 with the 
Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid default. If 
no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, Boise, 
Idaho 83720-6000 (208) 334-6000. 
Complaint - Page - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the,} OJ day of '9Je"i,1/k ,2005, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Complaint ~: 
Employer's Name & Address 
Thompson Creek Mining Company 
P.O. Box 62 
Clayton, ID 83227 
Via: () Personal Service of Process 
(X) Regular U.S. Mail 
Surety's Name & Address 
Ace Fire Underwriters' Ins. Co. 
P.O. Box 707 
New Meadows, ID 83654 
Via: ( ) Personal Service of Process 
Via: (X) Regular U.S. Mail 
o I have not served a copy ofthe Complaint on anyone. 
Signature 
Complaint - Page - 3 8 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
I.C. NO. 00-020426 INJURY DATE =5/..;::;6=/2=0..=..00"'--_______ _ 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
V. J. Magee Emil F. Pike, Jr. 
117 Mill Street PO Box 302 
Toston, MT 59643 Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME 
Thompson Creek Mining Company AND ADDRESS 
PO Box 62 ACE Fire Underwriters Insurance Company 
Clayton, 10 83277 c/o ACE USA 
PO Box 707 
New Meadows, ID 83654 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME 
ADDRESS) AND ADDRESS) 
Glenna M. Christensen, ISB No. 2333 
rv1CFFATT, THOiviAS, 8A~r\cTT, ROCK & F:cL8S, CH,':..::r;;:~ED 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
208/345-2000 
208/385-5384 (fax) ',J 
gmc@moffatt.com --'1 .-',:;: ... -
"'0 . -.-, 
.:> r"l --' 
~ The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating;-'~ co 
o The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: ]> 
IT IS: (Check One) 
Admitted Denied 
[ZJ 0 
[8J 0 
[8J 0 
[8J 0 
NA 
[8J ID 
NA 
[8J 0 
[8J 0 
G 
,.,. 0-
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or 
about the time claimed. 
2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly [g] 
entirely 0 by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the 
nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of 
and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment. 
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given 
to the employe:- as soon as pr2ctical but r.ot !3ter than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the 
manifestation of such occupational disease. 
7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five 
months after the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted. 
8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to 
Idaho Code, Section 72-419: $ __ . 
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? 
Those paid. 
IC1003 (Rev. 1094) (COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) Answer-Page 1 of 2 
BOI.MT2:5782971 
(Continued from front) 
11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses. 
I. 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the issues raised in the claimant's complaint have been previously decided by the Industrial 
Commission in its decision of October 15, 2004, reconfirmed in its Order Denying Reconsideration filed December 3, 2004. 
II. 
Defendants further deny knowledge of any change in condition or other basis for said complaint. 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. 
A copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular 
U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by 
law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and 
accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule III(D), Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure under the ld2ho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I.C. 1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. DYES ~NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
No. 
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date Dated S'&:l°oP'Llom,Y 
PPD TID Medical 4/15/2005 
$25,905.00 $31,905.79 $68,125.47 Mark C. Peterson 
for Glenna M. Christensen 
PLEASE COMPLETE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of April, 2005, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Emil F. Pike, Jr. 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, 10 83303-0302 
via: D personal service of process 
[8l regular U.S. Mail 
IC1003 (Rev. 1094) 
EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
(if applicable) 
via: o personal service of process via: o personal service of process 
,\JLUSMaH o cegulac U.S. MaH UC 
Signature 
Answer-Page 2 of 2 
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EMIL F. PIKE,JR., P.A. 
ATIORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O. BOX302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: 208/734-9960 
Fax Number: 208/734-9960 
Idaho Stale Bar No. 974 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
V. J. MAGEE, ) I.C. No. 00-020426 
) 
Claimant. ) 
) REQUEST FOR 
vs. ) CALENDARING 
) 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING ) 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
Employer, ) 
) 
and ) .. 
) :; J-
ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) ~, 
.J 
) <'< • .) 
Surety, ) 
Defendants. ) 
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.. /') 
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-:; ,~j 
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COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel of record, and 
jJursuant to RUle Viii(C) of the Judicial Ruies of Practice and Procedure and hereby 
requests that the above-captioned cause and matter be calendared for hearing. 
Pursuant to said Rule, Claimant advises as follows: 
1. Claimant requests the calendaring of this matter for hearing in 
either Twin Falls, Idaho, or Boise, Idaho. 
Request for Calendaring - 1 
\ \ 
2. The principal issues for determination by the Commission are 
as follows: 
(a) Whether Claimant has sustained a change in condition 
as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-719; 
(b) Whether Claimant is entitled to additional medical care 
as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432(1); 
(c) Whether there should be an increase in Claimant's 
benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3) (manifest 
injustice ); 
(d) Whether Claimant should be awarded an additional sum 
of compensation for permanent partial impairment; 
(e) Whether Claimant should be awarded additional 
compensation for permanent partial disability; 
(f) Whether Claimant should be awarded workers' 
compensation benefits for total and permanent disability; 
and, 
(g) Whether Claimant should be awarded attorney's fees 
necessarily incurred in the prosecution of this action. 
3. The estimated length of hearing is one (1) day. 
Request for Calendaring - 2 
4. Counsel for Claimant requests that the hearing officer hearing 
this matter schedule with respective attorneys a telephone 
conference so the time for hearing of this matter may be set. 
DATED this 20th day of December, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 20 th day of December, 2006, I served a copy of the foregoing document, 
by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, upon 
the following: 
Glenna M. Christensen 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, 10 83701 
Emil F. Pike, Jr. J ;-~ 
'" 
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Glenna M. Christensen, ISB No. 2333 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
gmc@moffatt.com 
15-784.59 
Attorneys for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
V. J. MAGEE, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING COMP MTY, 
Employer, 
and 
ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.e. No. 00-020426 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
-
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COME NOW the defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, in response to 
claimant's Request for Calendaring and advise the Industrial Commission as follows: 
1. Readiness for Hearing: Defendants believe this matter is ready for 
hearing. 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 1 BOI_MT2:636734,1 
2. Issues: 
a. There is an issue as to whether the issues raised in claimant's 
complaint are res judicata, having been previously decided by the 
Industrial Commission in its decision of October 15, 2004, 
reconfirmed in its order denying consideration filed December 3, 
2004, reaffirmed on appeal, by the Idaho Supreme Court, in a 
decision issued March 20, 2006, following which the Supreme 
Court denied the claimant's petition for rehearing on May 9,2006. 
b. There is a further issue as to whether claimant's claim under Idaho 
Code Section 72-419 is barred by the five-year statute of 
limitations contained therein. 
c. There is a further issue, whether claimant's request for reweighing 
the evidence, because of a unfavorable decision, is properly 
considered under the category of manifest injustice. 
d. As to the claimant's request for additional medical care, defendants 
are unaware of any request for additional medical care and no 
medical treatment has been denied, the bills for the same having 
been paid. 
3. Desired Location of Hearing: Boise, Idaho. 
4. Estimated Length of Hearing: One-half day. 
5. Counsel's Unavailable Dates: 
December 2006; 
January 1-10, 15, 16,22-24; 
February 5-7, 15,20-22; 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 2 BOI_MT2:6367341 
IS 
March 19-31; 
April 1-11; 
May 18-30; 
June 4, 19-20,26,2007. 
6. Who Should Hear This Matter: Defendants believe it may appropriately 
be heard by a Commission referee. 
7. Other Information: None. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2007. 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 3 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
'. /~< t I/) .~,f <-
'f'" il."! /-::_, By<f~V!ut_ e' / \ ~t.W~ 
/,/"'-~lenna M. Christensen Of the Firm 
I / Attorneys for Defendants 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of January, 2007, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
CALENDARING to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Emil F. Pike, Jf. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Fax: 208/734-9930 
Attorney for Claimant 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 4 
(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
BOI_MT2:6367341 (I 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
v. J. MAGEE, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING COMPANY, ) 
) 
Employer, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
ACE FIRE UNDERWRlTERS INSURANCE, ) 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
IC 2000-020426 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
fEB 0 1 !2DU7r 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
May 8, 2007, at 10:00 a.m., ~or one day, in the Industrial Commission Field Office, 1411 Falls 
Avenue East, Suite 915, City of Twin Falls, County of Twin Falls, State ofIdaho, on the following 
Issues: 
1. Whether Claimant has sustained a change in condition pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72 719; 
2. Whether Claimant's claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719 is barred by the five-year 
statute of limitations contained therein; 
3. Whether the issues raised by Claimant are res judicata; 
4. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary additional medical care as 
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional permanent partial impairment (PPI), and 
the extent thereof; 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 I~ 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional permanent partial or permanent total 
disability (PPDIPTD) in excess of permanent impairment, and the extent thereof; 
7. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional permanent total disability pursuant to the 
odd-lot doctrine; and, 
8. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's unreasonable 
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
If the above-entitled matter settles prior to hearing, the Commission must be notified in 
writing. 
Ie-DATED this day of February, 2007. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Michael E. Powers, Re eree 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2: 
I hereby certifY that on the I day of February, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
NOTICE OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the following: 
EMIL F PIKE JR 
POBOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
GLENNA M CHRISTENSEN 
POBOX 829 
BOISE ID 83701-0829 
E-mailed to field office 
E-mailed to Virginia Bailey & Maureen Newton 
gina tEspinosa 
ge 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
v. J. MAGEE, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
v. ) IC 2000-020426 
) 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING COMPANY, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Employer, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
) AND RECOMMENDATION 
and ) 
) FILED ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) OCT 21 2008 ) 
Surety, ) !NDUSTRlAL COMMISSION 
Defendants. ) 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-
entitled matter to Referee Michael E. Powers, who conducted a hearing in Twin Falls, Idaho, on 
May 8,2007. Claimant was present and represented by Emil Pike, Jr., of Twin Falls. Glenna M. 
Christensen of Boise represented Employer/Surety. Oral and documentary evidence was 
presented. The parties took four post-hearing depositions and submitted post-hearing briefs. 
This matter came under advisement on July 15,2008, and is now ready for decision. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A previous hearing was held by the Industrial Commission on March 17, 2004, for which 
the same parties, attorneys and referee were present. The Commission issued a decision on 
October 15, 2004, with the following Conclusions of Law: 
RECOMMENDATION - 1 
1. Claimant suffered an injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course 
of his employment on May 6, 2000. 
2. Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits equaling 10% 
of the whole person with no apportionment for pre-existing conditions. 
3. Claimant is not entitled to continuing medical care. 
4. Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits equaling 20% 
of the whole person inclusive of his PPI. 
5. Apportionment of PPD benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 IS not 
appropriate. 
6. Claimant is entitled to be reimbursed for any payments made to Dr. Kurtz and 
Defendants are liable for any unpaid balance. 
7. Claimant is entitled to be reimbursed for mileage to obtain medical treatment. 
8. Claimant is entitled to be reimbursed for any payments made for prescriptions 
prescribed by Dr. Kurtz and Defendants are liable for any unpaid balance with the exception of 
one prescription for Amaryl. 
Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 3, 2004, which was denied by 
the Commission on December 2, 2004. Claimant filed an appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court 
on January 12, 2005, with regard to adverse findings regarding permanent disability and future 
medical benefits. 
In Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 142 Idaho 761, 133 P.3d 1226 (2006), the 
Court affirmed the decision of the Commission. Claimant's Motion for Rehearing was denied on 
May 9, 2006. The Court clarified that the Commission's determination of non-entitlement to 
future medical care referred to further Colchicine injections or Prolo therapy but not to other 
medical care or need for prescription medication. All other findings were expressly affirmed, as 
drafted by the Commission. 
While his appeal was pending before the Idaho Supreme Court, Claimant filed a separate 
Complaint with the Commission on March 29,2005, in which he asserted that the Commission's 
RECOMMENDATION - 2 
initial award should be modified as pennitted by Idaho Code § 72-719, due to a change in 
Claimant's condition and/or because the initial award resulted in manifest injustice. The hearing 
of May 8, 2007 was held to address this issue and to detennine if the previously decided issues 
should be re-visited. 
ISSUES 
By agreement of the parties at hearing, the issues to be decided are: 
1. Whether Claimant has sustained a change in condition pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-719; 
2. Whether the case is properly reviewed pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719 to correct 
a manifest injustice; 
3. Whether Claimant's claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719 is barred by the five-
year statute of limitations contained therein; 1 
4. Whether the issues raised by Claimant are res judicata; 
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary additional medical care 
as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof; 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional pennanent partial impainnent (PPI), 
and the extent thereof; 
7. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional pennanent partial disability (PPD) in 
excess of pennanent impainnent, and the extent thereof; 
8. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional pennanent disability pursuant to the 
odd-lot doctrine or otherwise; and 
1 Defendants withdrew this issue in its post-hearing brief based on evidence that Claimant's 
Complaint regarding Idaho Code § 72-719 issues was timely filed. The limitations issue will not 
be further addressed in this decision. 
RECOMMENDATION - 3 
9. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's 
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant contends that the 10% PPI rating and 20% PPD rating previously assigned are 
inequitable and that he should be found 100% disabled, or in the alternative, that he should be 
deemed totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. Claimant maintains 
that the Commission may properly modify its previous order pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719 
because his condition has changed as the result of depression and implantation of a nerve 
stimulator. Further, Claimant asserts that failure to modify the previous award will result in 
manifest injustice. 
Defendants contend that Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof to establish a 
change in condition or manifest injustice that would warrant modification of the Commission's 
previous decision, which has been affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court and become final. 
Alternatively, Defendants maintain that Claimant's condition has slightly improved rather than 
worsened and that an increase in impairment and/or disability benefits is not warranted. 
Defendants argue that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable and that new evidence presented 
by Claimant at the 2007 hearing should have and could have been presented at the previous 
hearing. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. All evidence considered in the Industrial Commission's decision of 
October 15,2004; 
2. The Industrial Commission's legal file; 
RECOMMENDATION - 4 
3. Claimant's Exhibits 1 through 3 admitted at the May 8,2007 hearing; and 
4. The post-hearing depositions of Curt G. Kurtz, M.D., and Jim Deming, Ed.D., 
taken by Claimant on July 11, 2007; the post-hearing deposition of Roy Tyler Frizzell, M.D., 
taken by Defendants on July 26, 2007; and the post-hearing deposition of Douglas Crum, 
CDMS, with one exhibit taken by Claimant on February 12, 2008. 
Defendants' objections made during the taking of Dr. Kurtz' deposition are overruled. 
After having considered all the above evidence and the briefs of the parties, the Referee 
submits the following findings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Relevant Findings from October 15, 2004, Hearing 
1. Claimant was 53 years of age at the time of the [October 15, 2004] hearing and 
resided in Radersburg, a small mining town in Montana. He has an 8th grade education and no 
GED. He has worked primarily as an underground miner and millwright, but has also worked in 
the oil fields and has driven trucks. He has generally worked as a heavy laborer. 
2. Claimant injured his back, SI joint, and left ulnar nerve in 1983; it took him about 
three years to recover. Since that time he was able to return to heavy work. 
3. Claimant alleges that on May 6, 2000, he either mis-stepped or slipped while 
going up some stairs at Employer's mine near Challis and fell on his leg on the landing. He 
thought he pulled a muscle in his right hip. He finished his shift as he "didn't think nothing 
about it." 
4. Claimant's shift ended at 7:00 a.m. and he went to his temporary home in Clayton 
and went to bed. By 10:00 a.m. he was experiencing pain down his right leg. He had a neighbor 
summon an ambulance that was kept at Employer's mine and he was transported to the hospital 
at Sun Valley. He gave a history consistent with his hearing testimony regarding his near slip 
and fall. He was complaining of severe low back pain with radiation into his right leg, but not 
RECOMMENDATION - 5 
beyond his knee. The treating physician diagnosed acute low back pain with sciatica. An X-ray 
did not reveal any acute pathology of the lumbar spine. An MRI was ordered to rule out an acute 
herniation or free fragment versus a simple strain. Of note, Claimant was kept overnight as he 
was unable to be treated adequately for pain with IM Demerol100, 4 mg total of morphine, and 
2 oral Vicodin. 
5. Claimant's wife (Cathy) [now ex-wife] drove from Montana to pick Claimant up 
the following day. His wife testified that he was in "agony" of a type she had not seen before 
when she picked him up. Claimant testified, "[m]y wife took me home and dumped me on the 
floor at the house and said, 'I've got to go to work,' and that - I stayed there for a month on the 
floor in the house." Cathy corroborated Claimant's testimony in that regard but testified she 
thought he lay on the floor from two weeks to a month before he first sought medical treatment. 
6. Claimant eventually contacted his family physician, Curt G. Kurtz, M.D., who 
had him come to his (Dr. Kurtz) house for treatment. Dr. Kurtz testified that Claimant stayed at 
his home for several days until he was stable enough to return to his own home. Dr. Kurtz had 
no memory of making a note of that visit but his records admitted into evidence show that he saw 
Claimant for the first time regarding the subject accident on May 11, 2000. Consequently, both 
Claimant and his wife are in error regarding the amount of time Claimant spent lying on the floor 
(five days versus two weeks to a month). 
7. Claimant embarked upon a lengthy course of treatment with Dr. Kurtz, a board-
certified family practitioner who has practiced in Montana since 1968. That treatment spanned 
slightly over three years and involved approximately 88 weekly or biweekly visits according to 
his medical records that consume 103 pages of the record. Dr. Kurtz treated Claimant primarily 
for an acute low back strain, a stretched sciatic nerve, and an SIjoint "disruption." His treatment 
regimen included Colchicine IV, trigger point injections, and Prolo therapy. Dr. Kurtz described 
Colchicine as a "real old anti-inflammatory" that reduces swelling in nerves and other tissue. It 
is FDA-approved for the treatment of acute gout only. Dr. Kurtz described ProIo therapy as: 
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Prolo therapy is an old treatment from Germany that dates back about 150 
years where they felt that if you injected an irritant into a tendon or a joint or a 
ligament or a muscle that the irritation would cause the memory of the cells that 
created the muscle to come forward, the memory would open up, you take a look 
around, clean out the junk and actually build a new ligament, tendon, muscle, joint 
lining, et. cetera. 
Dr. Kurtz' deposition of April 13, 2004, pp. 13-14. 
8. Dr. Kurtz assigned Claimant a whole person PPI rating of 28% according to DRE 
category V of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition 
(Guides). He assigned an additional 10% whole person PPI according to Table 15-19 for a 
fracture of the sacrum into the SI joint for a total of 38%.2 At Defendants' request, 
Henry H. Gary, M.D., a board-certified neurosurgeon, and Michael A. Sousa, M.D., a board-
certified orthopedic surgeon and IME examiner, both practicing in Montana (the panel), saw 
Claimant on May 1, 2001, and again on March 3, 2004. Utilizing the Fourth Edition of the 
Guides, page 31102, DRE Lumbosacral, Category 3, the panel assigned Claimant a 10% whole 
person PPI. Dr. Sousa commented in his deposition on the methodology used by Dr. Kurtz in 
arriving at his PPI rating: 
Q. (By Ms. Christensen): No. He [Dr. Kurtz] was looking at the Fourth 
Edition - excuse me-the Fifth Edition, page 387. He looked under DRE, 
Category 4 is where he placed him? 
A. Well, first of all, there's two things: One is there is no evidence that 
Mr. Magee had a sacroiliac fracture, at least from the record that we evaluated. 
There was no X-ray evidence or CT evidence that he had sustained a fracture of the 
sacroiliac. 
Secondly, the DRE Category 4 impairment is for a loss of integrity of a 
segmental region in the spine secondary to either fusion or injury in which there's a 
translation ofthe vertebrae, one upon the other, and neither of which he had had. 
So I - and actually the Category 5, 28 percent, I'm sorry, would be - and 
I'll read: The impairment would be one [that] meets criteria for Categories 3 and 4; 
that is, both radiculopathy, i.e. nerve injury, if you will, from a disc herniation, and 
alterations of motion segment integrity in which they're either fused if there's 
significant slippage of one vertebrae on another. And, also, there has to be 
2 The Referee takes notice that according to the combined values chart in the Guides, 5th Edition, 
28% plus 10% equals 35%, not 38%. 
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significant lower extremity impairment, as seen with - indicated by atrophy or loss 
of reflexes and sensory changes in anatomic distribution. 
So the clincher is that, one, it's a different impairment book. Secondly, the 
patient does not have evidence - and the evidence that we were presented with - of 
altered motion segment integrity. And so he would not fit in Category S, unless he 
did have or consented to have a fusion, and reexploration of the LS-S 1 disc spaces 
had been recommended. 
Dr. Sousa's deposition of April 14, 2004, pp. 18-19. 
9. The panel opined that their 10% whole person PPI rating would also apply to any 
PPI that would have been assigned for Claimant's 1983 injury and discectomy. However, 
because the panel had no medical records regarding the 1983 injury and were not aware of any 
PPI rating being assigned for that injury, they assigned their rating based on the 2000 injury. 
10. The Referee is more persuaded by the opinions of the panel than those of 
Dr. Kurtz regarding PPI. It has been this Referee's experience that a rating in the neighborhood 
of 10% is common for the type of injuries sustained by Claimant. Because Claimant recovered 
from his 1983 back injury and returned to heavy labor for a number of years with no apparent 
difficulty, the Referee finds that apportionment is not warranted in this case. The Referee finds 
that Claimant has incurred a 10% whole person PPI solely as the result of his May 6, 2000, 
lllJury. 
11. Dr. Kurtz testified that he recommends Claimant continue with the Colchicine 
injections to keep his injured LS-SI nerve root unswollen to allow Claimant to be more active. 
He testified that the Prolo therapy stabilized Claimant's SI joint but he would continue those 
injections if Claimant continued to experience pain in that area. 
12. In their report of May 1, 2001, the panel recommended two treatment options. 
One would be to continue with Dr. Kurtz conservative care including a stretching program and 
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories. The other would be a lumbosacral fusion. In the panel's 
report of March 3, 2004, they indicate that Claimant told them he does not wish for surgery or 
any more injections, but may change his mind if his condition deteriorates. They also note that 
Claimant informed them that Dr. Kurtz' Colchicine injections had been beneficial. Because 
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Claimant did not want surgery or other invasive treatment, the panel did not recommend further 
diagnostic testing. However, should Claimant's symptoms worsen, they recommend a repeat 
MRI scan with contrast. They do recommend continuing conservative care. In his 
April 14,2004, deposition, Dr. Gary testified that Claimant should not continue with the 
Colchicine IV treatment. The Referee finds that Claimant has failed to prove his need for further 
medical treatment as the result of his May 6, 2000, injury. Dr. Kurtz testified that it should take 
three to four years for Claimant to heal. As for Dr. Kurtz deposition on April 13, 2004, it had 
been close to four years since Claimant's injury. In the event Claimant's condition worsens and 
he changes his mind regarding surgery or other invasive treatment options, he has available to 
him Idaho Code § 72-432(1) or may petition for a change of condition pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-719(1)(a). 
13. As previously indicated, Claimant's work history has been that of doing heavy 
work. The panel has opined Claimant now fits within the sedentary-to-light work categories 
with ad lib position changes and no prolonged sitting, standing, stooping, or bending. 
14. Dr. Kurtz does not believe Claimant can work at all because: 
Q. (By Mr. Pike): Now, Doctor, in a report dated November 2ih, 2001, 
you stated that Mr. Magee could possibly return to work in his field. Restrictions 
would be on the weight he could lift and that he could carry, and so in [sic] 
November 2i\ 2001, you indicated he could possibly return to work with some 
restrictions on the weight. 
Today are you changing that opinion or do you still have that opinion 
today? 
A. No. In November of 2001 I was trying to work with the - the 
company that he worked for to get him back to work. And we tried to get - with 
the restrictions placed, but he got down there and there was nothing that he could 
do with those restrictions at all. 
And at this point in time, after watching him and getting everything back 
and stable and everything else and seeing that he still has chronic pain, he still is 
being adversely affected by the weather, he's still being adversely affected by 
electrical storms, and it's so unpredictable as to whether he can drive or not 
because of the swelling in his lower back, I would say that he could not go back to 
work. 
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Dr. Kurtz' deposition of April 13, 2004, pp. 29-30. 
In spite of the foregoing, Dr. Kurtz checked a box "yes" in a letter dated June 4, 2002, 
from Surety's case management service indicating he agreed with the panel's opinion that 
Claimant could perform sedentary to light work. Claimant's Exhibit B admitted at 2004 hearing. 
15. After his accident, a caseworker for Surety informed Claimant that he must return 
to a light-duty position doing inventory and cleaning parts or he would lose his benefits. 
Claimant testified that he worked for four or five days but could not continue due to his having to 
take pain medication and was afraid he would get in an accident while driving the mountain road 
between the mine and his trailer in Clayton. Employer's Human Resources Safety Manager, 
Linda Wanstrath, confirmed that it was a caseworker who determined that Claimant could return 
to light-duty work. However, Wanstrath testified that Claimant only worked one day before he 
obtained a release from Dr. Kurtz taking him completely off work. She also testified that she 
observed Claimant working and that he did not appear to be having any difficulty. The light-
duty job provided to Claimant was not intended to become a permanent position. 
16. The only other employment Claimant attempted was flagging on highway jobs in 
2001. He testified that he made about $4,000 dollars but because he was taking up to 100 pain 
pills on a four-day job he was afraid of injuring himself so he quit. 
17. There is scant evidence regarding Claimant's employability in his labor market. 
No vocational consultants were involved in this case. The Referee is not acquainted with the 
labor market surrounding Claimant's current residence in Radersburg, Montana, and there is 
nothing in the record regarding the same. Claimant testified he could work in Bozeman or 
Helena but knows of no work that he could do. He is presently receiving Social Security 
disability benefits. He has not registered for the job service and has not requested vocational 
assistance in any job search. Dr. Kurtz opinion that Claimant is unemployable is not persuasive. 
Claimant's work attempts are also not persuasive as he voluntarily quit his flagging job based on 
his own opinions regarding safety issues; no physician opined he could not perform that type of 
work. He has not attempted to locate work since his flagging job in 2001. On the present record, 
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the Referee is not convinced that any further effort by Claimant to locate employment would be 
futile as there is no evidence of the availability of sedentary or light jobs in his labor market. 
The Referee finds that Claimant has failed to establish a prima facie case of odd-lot status. See, 
Seufert v. Larson, 137 Idaho 589,51 P.3d 403 (2002). 
18. Even though Claimant has failed to establish odd-lot status, that finding does not 
end the enquiry regarding whether he has incurred some PPD less than total. Claimant has lost 
access to medium and heavy labor jobs that he had access to prior to his accident and injury in 
2000. He cannot return to his time-of-injury job as a millwright. He earned a decent living as a 
miner and millwright ($14-$20 an hour) and will no doubt suffer a wage loss if he re-enters the 
labor market. No vocational expert has quantified the loss of access or wages. However, based 
on the Referee's experience in other cases, Claimant's prior work history, his demeanor and 
physical appearance at hearing, his seeming lack of motivation to return to any type of work, his 
education, his transferable skills in operating equipment and problem-solving, his age, and his 
economic and personal circumstances, the Referee finds that Claimant has incurred PPD of 20% 
of the whole person inclusive of his 10% PPI. The Referee further finds that apportionment 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 is not appropriate in this case as Claimant had returned to doing 
heavy work for a number of years after his 1983 back injury. 
New Findings from May 8, 2007, Hearing 
Claimant 
19. Claimant continues to reside in Radersburg, Montana, which has a population of 
approximately 150 in the summer and 50 in the winter. He resided in Cascade, Montana, at the 
time of his industrial injury of May 2000. Cascade has a popUlation of approximately 2,000 
people and is 30 miles away from Great Falls, Montana. People in Cascade frequently commute 
to Great Falls for work. Claimant moved to the more remote town of Radersburg because it was 
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where he could afford to live. When Claimant was performing work for Employer, he stayed in 
a temporary residence in Clayton, Idaho. 
20. Claimant describes his physical being as "about the same as it was" at the time of 
the 2004 hearing. However, Claimant's mental attitude has been impacted by depression and he 
has undergone the implantation of an electrical stimulator to help with pain reduction. 
May 8,2007 hearing transcript, p 12. 
21. Claimant's depression worsened to the point that he was considering suicide and 
he sought treatment with a psychologist in Bozeman, Jim Deming, Ed.D. Dr. Deming referred 
Claimant to Roy Tyler Frizzell, M.D., who treats disorders of the spine. Dr. Frizzell implanted a 
spinal cord stimulator for Claimant in December 2005. 
22. Claimant testified that the stimulator has helped his conditions in some respects 
but that its use comes with complications. If Claimant uses his stimulator for a full 24-hour 
period, it "gets hot and irritates muscles." May 8, 2007 hearing transcript, p. 15. Claimant 
explained that he is unable to use his stimulator around certain types of machinery, in certain 
types of weather, or when he drives because the device is susceptible to surges of electricity. 
Household appliances and his television do not interfere with use of the stimulator. The benefit 
of using the stimulator is that it relieves Claimant's pain to the extent that he is able to reduce the 
amount of medication he takes. Overall, Claimant feels he is better off with the stimulator than 
he was without it. 
23. Claimant has attempted employment since the previous hearing in 2004, but has 
not been successful in keeping a job. Claimant drove a potato truck for approximately three 
weeks in September 2006, but could not tolerate his pain level. He could not use his stimulator 
while driving machinery and felt that it was unsafe to operate the machinery while taking pain 
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medication. He attempted work for a livestock auction, sorting cattle through gates and into 
various pens. He experienced significant pain after standing on concrete all day, and would need 
pain medication which was problematic because of his 42-mile commute. He lasted four days at 
the livestock auction. Claimant sorted potatoes for about four weeks but had similar problems 
with pain and his commute. Claimant turned down a lucrative mining position in Alaska because 
it exceeded his physical restrictions. He is not registered with Job Service or any type of 
employment agency. 
24. Claimant receives social security disability benefits of approximately $1,100 per 
month. 
25. Claimant continues to treat with Dr. Kurtz on an occasional basis and drives 
approximately 50 miles each way to do so. 
26. Defendants have continued to pay for medical treatment, other than the 
Colchicine injections which were cut off. Claimant has Medicare which covers 80% of the cost 
of each injection. 
27. At the time of the May 2007 hearing, Claimant was taking approximately 125 to 
150 Hydrocodone per month as well as 45 Oxycodone. He took at least twice as much 
medication prior to implantation of his nerve stimulator. 
Dr. Kurtz 
28. Dr. Kurtz has continued to serve as Claimant's treating physician. He testified 
that Claimant suffers from chronic pain which will require on-going prescription medication. 
Claimant takes Ultram, Norco, Lyrica, Effexor and Oxycodone. The medications prevent 
Claimant from working around heavy machinery or traveling by car more than 75 miles at a 
time. 
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29. Dr. Kurtz believes that Claimant should not return to any type of employment 
because Claimant's personality is such that he gives full effort and would take it upon himself to 
over-exert. Dr. Kurtz clarified his chart note of April 4, 2007 in which he indicated that 
"[Claimant] will never return to full time work and maybe [sic] able to do some partime [sic] 
limited work. Heavy lifting greater than 20 pounds is out." Claimant's Exhibit 1 admitted at the 
2007 hearing. Dr. Kurtz testified that he meant that Claimant could perform light work around 
the house as opposed to returning to a light-duty employment situation. He feels that Claimant 
needs to be able to self-regulate limitations and not risk an employer requesting that he exceed 
his limitations. 
30. The changes that have occurred in Claimant's condition since 2004 are the 
development of depression and the implantation of the stimulator. Use of the stimulator has 
allowed Claimant to reduce medications by 50% and reduce his follow-up visits with Dr. Kurtz 
from every two weeks to once a month. The depression requires medical management and is 
subject to recurrent episodes. 
31. With regard to Claimant's condition, Dr. Kurtz testified that: 
... [W]e have stabilized his pain. There's been no change in his ability to do more 
things or less things or anything else. It's just been status quo. And I don't 
foresee any change that would allow him to go back to a normal working type of 
situation. 
Dr. Kurtz' Deposition of July 2007, p. 18. 
Dr. Deming 
32. Dr. Deming is a psychologist who first treated Claimant for his depression in July 
2005. He previously provided marriage counseling to Claimant. Dr. Deming diagnosed major 
depressive disorder with suicidal ideation related to chronic pain and attributable to the May 
2000 industrial injury. Claimant's chronic pain results in a diminished capacity to sleep and 
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results in loss of energy. As a psychologist, Dr. Deming is not licensed to prescribe medication 
and he defers to Dr. Kurtz on issues relating to medication. 
33. Therapeutic interventions, including placement of the stimulator, reduced 
Claimant's pain to the extent that he was not immediately suicidal. However, Dr. Deming 
believes that Claimant will continue to struggle with depression as long as he experiences 
chronic pain. 
34. Dr. Deming's treatment focus is to return Claimant to some level of work. He 
feels that: 
[Claimant] can maintain some level of work-related activity for three or four, 
even five hours at a time. But as is consistent with individuals with pain 
problems, his recovery time for that exertion is oftentimes three, four, five days, 
and [ with] an increase in the use of medicine as well as an increase in the use of 
his neurostimulator treatment. 
Dr. Deming's deposition p. 9. 
Dr. Frizzell 
35. Dr. Frizzell is board-certified in neurosurgery and he primarily treats disorders of 
the cervical and lumbar spine. He implants approximately 50 spinal stimulators per year. Spinal 
cord stimulators diminish pain signals coming from an injured nerve by use of electrical currents. 
Adjustments are usually performed within the first six months of implantation and the batteries 
need to be replaced every seven years. Dr. Frizzell first treated Claimant on November 10, 2005, 
to address complaints of right-sided radiculopathy. He felt that Claimant was an appropriate 
candidate for a stimulator and Claimant underwent implantation on December 14, 2005. 
36. As of May 2006, Claimant reported 65% reduction of spinal complaints which is 
a better than average outcome. Dr. Frizzell reports that Claimant has had "a very consistent and 
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prolonged satisfactory course" which is anticipated to stay the same. Dr. Frizzell's Deposition, 
p. 15. 
37. As of April 2007, Dr. Frizzell placed Claimant in a light/medium work category. 
He assigned work limitations of 10 pounds maximum lift, pull, and push on an occasional basis 
with the ability to lift up to 25 pounds on an occasional basis. Claimant should avoid stooping 
and crawling which could interfere with the stimulator leads. 
38. Machinery that emits significant magnetic currents may change the function of 
Claimant's stimulator by turning it off or making it more intense. Machinery that is the type 
found in a large power plant would cause interference with the stimulator, but machinery in an 
agricultural setting such as a potato plant would not. Claimant's description of electrical spikes 
are reflective of concerns Dr. Frizzell has heard from other patients. Certain machinery such as a 
magnetic imaging machine might cause hyperactivity of the stimulator, but contact with a 
microwave oven would not since microwaves generally operate on a different frequency. 
39. Use of the stimulator impacts Claimant's level of pain, but does not alter 
Claimant's anatomy or physical condition. The stimulator allows Claimant to work with more 
force because it increases Claimant's ability to endure pain. 
Mr. Crum 
40. Douglas Crum, CDMS, is a vocational rehabilitation expert hired by Claimant to 
asses his employability in the Radersburg labor market. Mr. Crum reviewed medical records, the 
March 2003 determination of the Social Security Administration finding Claimant disabled as of 
May 7,2000, and the Industrial Commission's 2004 decision in this case. He conducted a phone 
interview with Claimant in May 2007. 
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41. Mr. Crum opined that, based on the medical restrictions of Dr. Frizzell and the 
panel, Claimant has lost access to 100% of the medium-to-heavy labor jobs he was able to 
perform prior to his 2000 injury. Claimant's current vocational options are limited by his age, 
physical capacity, lack of skills, basic education and questionable literacy skills. 
42. Mr. Crum concluded that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and that 
the workers' compensation system has failed Claimant, at least in terms of disability assessment. 
Claimant has no reasonable ability to access jobs in his labor market and attempts at employment 
would be futile. Mr. Crum indicated that it was possible, but unlikely, that Claimant could find 
light work in food preparation or at a gas station in Townsend, Montana, which is twelve miles 
away from Radersburg and has a population of approximately 150. 
43. Mr. Crum testified that Claimant's restrictions in 2007 were essentially the same 
as they were in 2004. Claimant's condition is somewhat improved based on the reduction in the 
amount of narcotic pain medication taken, but is otherwise the same. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
Res Judicata and Idaho Code § 72-719 
44. Defendants accurately summarized the legal doctrine of res judicata in their post-
hearing brief. The legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to agency 
proceedings, including those of the Industrial Commission. Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 
Idaho 513, 516, 915 P.2d 1371, 1374 (1996). Resjudicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true 
res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 
57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Under the principles of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment 
rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent 
action between the same parties upon the same claim. Id. The doctrine of claim preclusion bars 
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not only a subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also serves as an absolute 
bar to claims relating to the same cause of action which might have been made. Id. Stated 
differently, res judicata bars relitigation of matters already raised, and those that could or should 
have been raised from the outset. U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 999 P.2d 
877 (2000). The doctrine of res judicata extinguishes all claims arising out of the same 
transaction, or series of transactions from which the cause of action arose. Id at 881. 
45. Regarding the separate, but related, concept of collateral estoppel, Issue 
preclusion bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated in prior litigation between the very 
same parties. Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d 401 (2001). Five 
factors must be evident in order for collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of an issue 
determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue 
decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the 
issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final 
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Id. 
46. However, Idaho Code § 72-719 provides the Industrial Commission with 
authority to re-open an otherwise final award in limited situations. Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 
116 Idaho 1, 773 P.2d 269 (1988). Idaho Code § 72-719 states: 
MODIFICATION OF AWARDS AND AGREEMENTS -- GROUNDS -- TIME 
WITHIN WHICH MADE. (1) On application made by a party in interest filed 
with the commission at any time within five (5) years of the date of the accident 
causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, on the 
ground of a change in conditions, the commission may, but not oftener than once 
in six (6) months, review any order, agreement or award upon any of the 
following grounds: 
(a) Change in the nature or extent ofthe employee's injury or disablement; or 
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(b) Fraud. 
(2) The commission on such review may make an award ending, diminishing 
or increasing the compensation previously agreed upon or awarded, subject to the 
maximum and minimum provided in this law, and shall make its findings of fact, 
rulings of law and order or award, file the same in the office of the commission, 
and immediately send a copy thereof to the parties. 
(3) The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the 
date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an 
occupational disease, may review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice. 
(4) This section shall not apply to a commutation of payments under section 
72-404. 
47. There is no allegation or evidence of fraud in the present case. Accordingly, 
Claimant seeks to relitigate issues regarding medical benefits, permanent impairment, and 
permanent disability based on either a change in the nature or extent of his injury or disablement 
andJor to establish that modification of the Commission's award is necessary in order to correct a 
manifest injustice. 
Change in Nature ofInjurv or Disablement 
48. Since it is Claimant who seeks a modification of the Commission's previous 
decision, he bears the burden of showing a change in condition. Matthews v. Department of 
Corrections, 121 Idaho 680, 681 (1992). 
49. Claimant testified that his physical condition has not changed. Claimant's onset 
of depression is related to his 2000 injury and treatment was properly provided by Defendants 
for this condition. However, there is no evidence that Claimant's physical limitations were 
impacted by his depression andJor that Claimant's depression impacted his disablement. 
Claimant's depression is subject to recurrence, but is treatable with medication and counseling. 
50. Dr. Kurtz' opinions regarding Claimant's ability to return to work in 2007 are 
similar to the opinions he rendered in 2004. Dr. Kurtz has consistently indicated that Claimant 
has chronic pain and that he is unable to work beyond a self-controlled environment. Dr. Kurtz 
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considered Claimant's medication, the impact of weather and Claimant's inability to drive long 
distances when rendering his opinions in both 2004 and 2007. 
51. Work restrictions imposed by Dr. Frizzell in 2007 are nearly identical to the 
restrictions imposed by the panel that were adopted by the Commission in its 2004 decision. 
Claimant is able to perform light work without prolonged stooping or bending. Dr. Frizzell's 
2007 restrictions are slightly more liberal than those assigned in 2004. Dr. Frizzell testified that 
Claimant's physical condition was unchanged, but that he could tolerate more because of 
reduced pain secondary to the implantation of the stimulator. 
52. Mr. Crum testified that Claimant's restrictions in 2007 were essentially the same 
as in 2004. Neither Dr. Frizzell nor Mr. Crum identified a significant change in disablement due 
to potential interference from magnetic currents with Claimant's stimulator. 
53. Although various aspects of Claimant's situation have changed, he has failed to 
meet his burden of proof to establish that the nature or extent of his injury or disablement have 
changed since the 2004 hearing, such that he is entitled to relitigate his case pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-719. Claimant's depression was appropriately addressed. The implantation of a 
spinal stimulator relieved some of Claimant's pain and allowed him to reduce the amount of 
medication he takes. Neither situation impacted Claimant's physical restrictions or disablement. 
Manifest Injustice 
54. Defendants suggest in their post-hearing brief that the issue of modification of an 
award due to manifest injustice is not properly before the Industrial Commission since the 
statutory language of Idaho Code § 72-719(3) limits such review to situations when the 
Commission is acting on "its own motion" as opposed to a Complaint filed by a party. This 
assertion was recently addressed and rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Commission 
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may review any order to correct a manifest injustice, even when a purported manifest injustice is 
brought to the Commission's attention by either party or a third party. Page v. McCain Foods, 
Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008). 
55. The term "manifest injustice" should be construed broadly for purposes of 
determining whether an order of the Commission should be reopened. Goodson v. L.W. HuH 
Produce Co., 97 Idaho 264, 266, 543 P.2d 167, 169 (1975). "Manifest" has been defined to 
mean: capable of being easily understood or recognized at once by the mind; not obscure; 
obvious. "Injustice" has been defined to mean: absence of justice; violation of right or of the 
rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an unjust act or deed; wrong. Webster's, Third New 
International Dictionary, 1967, as quoted in Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 644 P.2d 331 (1982). 
56. In the present case, Claimant disagreed with the initial decision of the 
Commission and exhausted his appellate remedies. Claimant now seeks to reopen the case with 
the addition of evidence that the Commission specifically noted was absent from the record in 
the 2004 hearing. The initial findings of the referee noted that there was "scant evidence" 
regarding Claimant's employability and commented that Claimant made a single attempt to 
return to work for an alternate employer following his injury. See preceding paragraphs 16 and 
17. 
57. Defendants continue to pay medical benefits for Claimant's 2000 injury, except 
for Colchicine injections and Prolo therapy which were addressed in the 2004 decision. 
Claimant has opted to continue with the injections through Medicare. Defendants heeded the 
clarification of the Idaho Supreme Court in V.I. Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 142 
Idaho 761, 133 P.3d 1226 (2006) and have paid for other recommended treatment and 
prescription medication. 
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58. Claimant has received permanent impairment benefits consistent with a 10% PPI 
rating. There is no evidence that the assignment of a 10% PPI rating resulted in manifest 
injustice. 
59. Claimant received permanent disability benefits consistent with a 20% PPD 
rating, inclusive of his PPI. Claimant was receiving Social Security disability benefits at the 
time of both the 2004 and 2007 hearings. Claimant argued at the 2004 hearing that he was 
totally and permanently disabled, but the Commission ruled that he had not met his burden to 
prove total permanent disability. Although Claimant continues to disagree with this 
determination, the ruling did not result in manifest injustice. 
60. Claimant is collaterally estopped from relitigation of the issues litigated in 2004. 
Claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate issues of medical benefits, permanent 
impairment and permanent disability at his 2004 hearing and during the appeals process to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. Claimant now seeks to relitigate those same issues. The Industrial 
Commission's 2004 decision was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court and has become final. 
61. Since Claimant has failed to establish either a change in condition or manifest 
injustice pursuant to Idaho Code 72-719, it is improper to allow Claimant to relitigate the same 
issues with enhanced evidence. 
62. Even if the new vocational evidence offered by Claimant from Mr. Crum is 
considered, Claimant has failed to establish that he is permanently and totally disabled based on 
the limited opportunities in Radersburg, Montana. The Idaho Supreme Court has previously 
determined that a claimant should not be permitted to achieve permanent disability by changing 
his place of residence following an injury and that consideration of the labor market where the 
claimant resided at the time of injury may also be properly considered. Lyons v. Industrial 
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Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977). Claimant testified at hearing that 
he lived in Cascade, Montana, at the time of injury. The popUlation of Cascade is approximately 
2,100, compared to Radersburg which has an estimated population of 150. Further, Cascade is 
only 30 miles from Great Falls which presumably has a larger labor market than either Cascade 
or Radersburg. Mr. Crum did not consider this labor market. 
63. Claimant has not established an unreasonable denial of benefits and is not entitled 
to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Claimant has failed to establish a change in condition pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-719(1)(a). 
2. Application of the Industrial Commission's initial decision in this matter did not 
result in a manifest injustice that requires correction pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3). 
3. Issues regarding benefits were previously litigated and are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
4. Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-804. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Referee recommends that the Commission adopt the foregoing findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and issue an appropriate final order. 
DATED this rf!t- day of October, 2008. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Michael E. Powers, Referee 
ATTEST: 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
V. J. MAGEE, ) 
) 
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v. ) 
) 
TIIOMPSON CREEK MINING COMPANY, ) 
) 
Employer, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE) 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
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ORDER 
FILED 
OCT 21 2008 
INDUSTPAAL COMMISSION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-717, Referee Michael E. Powers submitted the record in the 
above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the undersigned 
Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendation of the Referee. The 
Commission concurs with this recommendation. Therefore, the Commission approves, confirms, 
and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant has failed to establish a change in condition pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-719(1)(a). 
2. Application of the Industrial Commission's initial decision in this matter did not 
result in a manifest injustice that requires correction pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3). 
3. Issues regarding benefits were previously litigated and are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
ORDER-l 
4. Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-804. 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. 
Sf' 
DATEDthisdl- dayof OC±cJbr ,2008. 
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MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
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COMES NOW the Claimant, V.J. Magee through his attorney of 
record, Emil F. Pike, Jr., and respectfully moves this Industrial Commission to 
reconsider its Finds of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed in this matter on 
October 21, 2008. This matter is brought before the Industrial Commission 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§72-719(a) and 72-719 (3) and in order to correct an 
impairment and disability evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code §§72-424, 72-425 and 
72-430. 
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I.C. No. 00-020426 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW the Claimant, V.J. Magee through his~ attorney of 
record, Emil F. Pike, Jr., and respectfully moves this Industrial Commission to 
reconsider its Finds of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed in this matter on 
October 21, 2008. This matter is brought before the Industrial Commission 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§72-719(a) and 72-719 (3) and in order to correct an 
impairment and disability evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code §§72-424, 72-425 and 
72-430. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
Mr. Magee's medical problem with reference to returning to gainful 
employment has been hindered by unremitting back pain which relates to his 
industrial accident of May 6, 2000. Mr. Magee's problem with unremitting chronic 
back pain has been attested to by every physician having occasion to treat or 
examine him. There is no medical evidence to the contrary. The problem with pain 
has not only interfered with Mr. Magee's ability to return to employment but has also 
caused him to suffer from major depression reaching to the level of suicide. 
Deming Depo. P. 6, LL. 12-17. The Defendants in their Post Hearing Brief, 
paragraph three (3) thereof set forth their statement of facts, a portion thereof is 
herein quoted. 
"At the time of the initial hearing of this matter Claimant 
was a fifty-three (53) year old male born in Butte, 
Montana where he completed his education through the 
eighth (8th) grade level. 2004 Hearing Tr. at 10:2-11. 
Essentially all of Claimant's occupational history has 
been that of heavy physical labor. Claimant has worked 
mostly in the oil and hard rock mining industries and also 
has experienced driving various models of trucks as well 
as skidding and hauling logs. Tr. at 10: 15-24. During 
his time in the oil industry Claimant did receive some 
formal training/education in the mechanisms and 
operations of hydraulic pumps. Claimant's mining 
experience included running a hard rock crusher, but 
mostly he has worked as a self-described millwright-
essentially a facility mechanic who make rounds insuring 
the proper functioning of the mining equipment as well 
as making any necessary repairs. Tr. at 11 :24-12:8. 
Not surprisingly, Claimant's millwright occupation is 
physically demanding given the size and weight of the 
machinery involved. Claimant's alleged accident with 
the resulting injury took place while he was employed by 
Thompson Creek in a millwright capacity. Tr. at 12:20-
13:1. 
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Mr. Magee's education, work experience, injury and pain parallel the work 
experience and disability of Mr. Lyons as set forth in the Idaho case of Lyons v. 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 564 P.2d 1360 (Idaho 1977), 
wherein it is stated, 
"an evaluation of total disability requires an appraisal of 
the Claimant's present and probable future ability to sell 
his services in a competitive labor market. I.C. §72-425. 
Prior to 1972 the appellant's employment history 
consisted entirely of heavy manual labor. It is 
undisputed that he cannot perform such jobs in the 
future and that if is employable at all it must be at some 
type of light work ... appellant has a ninth grade 
education and no special training or skills. His primary 
vocational asset was his ability to perform heavy manual 
labor. While his lack of formal education, special 
training, and usable skills did not prevent him from 
working in the past, it will undoubtedly lessen his 
chances of finding employment in the future. As best, 
appellant can only offer a prospective employer the 
ability to perform unskilled light work of a highly 
restricted nature." 
In Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 644 P.2d 331, 338 (1982) Justice 
Bistline in his concurring opinion stated, "in all cases the basic concern in 
determining whether sufficient cause exists to set aside an award is to insure a 
compensation proportionate to the degree and duration of the disability. Justice 
Bistline in his Opinion made reference to the California Labor Code which allows 
awards to be reopened for 'good cause'." Grounds commonly held to constitute 
good cause included the following. "Mistake of fact occasion by failure or inability to 
produce certain evidence at a prior hearing." Justice Bistline noted that "given the 
purpose of workmens' compensation acts, it is clear that the approach employed by 
the Minnesota and California Supreme Courts is the proper approach. The 
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Commission has the power to reopen an award or a settlement agreement at any 
time within the five (5) year period set forth in I.C. §72-719(3) whenever 
circumstances exist which render the original award inequitable." 
In this Commission's award entered on October 15, 2004, the Referee 
noted, "There is scant evidence regarding Claimant's employability in his labor 
market. No vocational consultants were involved in this case. The Referee is not 
acquainted with the labor markets surrounding Claimant's current residence in 
Radersville [sic:Radersburg], Montana and there is nothing in the record regarding 
the same. Claimant testified he could work in Bozeman or Helena but knows of no 
work that he could do." Findings of Fact, No. 22, p. 17. 
At the time of the hearing held on March 17, 2004, there was some 
testimony concerning the location of Mr. Magee's residence and the area wherein 
he could seek employment. 
Examination by Mr. Powers 
Q. And where did you consider home to be at that point? 
A. Cascade. 
Q. Alright and what is Cascade's claim to fame and with that I 
mean what kind of a town is it? Is it a logging town or is it -
A. No, it's just a little ranch community. 
Q. What's the population there if you could estimate? 
A. 1500, maybe. 
Q. And what can you give me as the landmark as to what it is 
close to? 
A. It is between Helena and Great Falls. 
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Q. Okay. You now live in Radersburg? 
A. Radersburg. 
Q. And where is that? 
A. It is between Three Forks and Townsend. 
Q. So that's up in the northern part north of -
A. Towards Helena. From 90 you turn and go north towards 
Helena and you get to - you turn and go back and west 10 
miles is Radersburg. 
Q. How big a place is Radersburg. 
A. Its small, little old mining town. 
Q. So that's a mining town. 
A. Ya. Old, old, mining town. 
Further re-direct examination by Mr. Pike 
Q. Let's start with Radersburg. How far-approximately how large 
is Radersburg. 
A. Oh. In the summertime there is probably 150 people there. In 
the wintertime there is probably 50. 
Q. What's the closest town to Radersburg. 
A. Townsend. 
Q. Townsend? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how far is that from Radersburg? 
A. 25 miles. 
Q. And what's in that town? 
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so 
A. Oh. They have a hospital, grocery store, feed stores, 
pharmacy, cafe, bars. It's a logging - they have a sawmill 
there, and so it's a logging town. They have everything to 
accommodate that sawmill. 
O. Okay. Do they have mining there at-at that town? 
A. At Radersburg? 
O. No. At Townsend. 
O. Yeah. 
A. No -huh-uh. 
O. What's the nearest city from Radersburg and by that city I 
mean population over 10,OOO? 
A. Bozeman. 
O. How far is Bozeman from Radersburg? 
A. About 67 miles. 
O. Do people that live in Radersburg - do they work in Bozeman? 
A. Yes or Helena. 
O. So you would work-people that live in Radersburg could work 
in Bozeman or that whole area. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
O. And what kind of radius - how far out from Radersburg do 
these people work. 
A. Well, I think one woman works - that works out of there she 
goes as far as clear up on Highline. She does dairy work some 
kind of - they do tests on dairy cows on milk. She goes that far 
up but most of them either work in Bozeman or Helena area. 
O. Now Helena, that's the capital city of Montana is that right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And that, that's a pretty large city with practically everything 
happening there in that city. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. In that whole area that we're talking about in the Radersburg 
area and the surrounding area, Bozeman and Helena, is there 
any type of work that you think you can engage in from which 
you could make a living? 
A. Not that I know of. No. 
Q. The reason for that is what? 
A. Because of the pain in this right leg. I don't know if I'm going to 
have to be down all day one day or if I am going to be up or if 
I'm going to have to be on pain medication. It just depends on 
what this nerve does to me. March 17, 2004 Tr. Pp. 60-63, P. 
64 LL. 1-4. 
In this hearing a Vocational Consultant was called upon to offer 
testimony as to the labor market surrounding Claimant's current residence in 
Radersburg, Montana and testimony as to Claimant's employability in a large 
population center, namely Helena, Montana. Mr. Douglas Crum testified that 
Radersburg, Montana is twenty-one (21) miles from Townsend, Montana, that 
Townsend is the county seat of Broadwater County and has a labor force of about 
two thousand two hundred (2,200) workers. The Radersburg area was 
characterized as being mostly ranching and agricultural, that Townsend has an 
economy based on schools, county government and some retailing and food and 
again ranching/ag work; that the population of Townsend was one thousand eight 
hundred (1,800). Crum Depo. p.18, L. 15 - p. 19, LL. 13. Mr. Crum testified that 
Mr. Magee might be able to work in some sort of very light work; perform some sort 
of food preparation; but, he thought it was unlikely. Tr. p. 20, LL. 7-24. Mr. Crum 
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was further of the opinion that he did not believe it was reasonable to expect that 
Mr. Magee would be able to obtain some form of employment by working through 
the Montana Employment Services. Mr. Crum was asked to comment on Dr. 
Deming's testimony to wit, "Its been his report and my belief that he can maintain 
some level of work related activity for three, four even five hours at a time but as is 
consistent with all individuals with pain problems, his recovery time for that exertion 
is often time three, four, five days and the increase in the use of medicine, as well 
as the increase in use of his neuro-stimulator treatment." Crum Depo. p. 28, LL. 
10-18. Mr. Crum responded, "Well, I mean obviously, just by what you define there 
it would take him out of full-time employment ... ". Crum Depo. p. 29, LL. 3-5. 
With reference to the Helena, Montana labor market, Mr. Crum testified, "It 
would certainly improve the chances of it - he still would have the same problems 
that he has now from a physical standpoint. If Dr. Deming is correct, and Dr. Kurtz 
in the prior statement that he wrote, that he can't do full-time work, that takes him 
out of the competitive labor market for full-time jobs." Crum Depo. p. 29, LL. 11-16. 
In his letter of May 3, 2007, Mr. Crum concluded, "I feel strongly that the workers' 
compensation system has failed Mr. Magee, at least in terms of the issue of 
disability." Crum Depo. Exhibit 1, p. 8. 
The Referee, Mr. Powers, in his Finds of Fact, noted, "Even if the new 
vocational evidence offered by Claimant from Mr. Crum is considered, Claimant has 
failed to establish that he is permanently and totally disabled based on the limited 
opportunities in Radersburg, Montana. The Idaho Supreme Court has previously 
determined that a claimant should not be determined to achieve permanent 
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disability by changing his place of residence following injury and that consideration 
of the labor market where the claimant resided at the time of injury may also be 
properly considered." Referee noted that the population of Cascade, Montana at 
the time of injury was two thousand one hundred (2,100)1 compared with 
Radersburg which has an estimated population of one hundred fifty (150). The 
Referee further noted that Cascade is only thirty (30) miles from Great Falls which 
presumably has a larger labor market than either Cascade or Radersburg. 
It is respectfully submitted that this is not an accurate summary of Mr. 
Crum's testimony. In his testimony, as noted above, Mr. Crum considered an 
employment area much more extensively than the village of Radersburg. He 
considered Townsend, Montana, which is twenty-one (21) miles from Radersburg 
and has a population of one thousand eight hundred sixty-seven (1,867) people with 
an economy based on schools, county government, retailing, ranching and ag-work; 
and, he considered the labor market of Helena, which is fifty (50) miles from 
Radersburg. Helena, in the year 2000, had the population including surrounding 
areas of 67,636 compared to the population of Great Falls, Montana, for the year 
2000 of 56,690. The argument that Mr. Magee has moved to Radersburg in order 
to obtain permanent disability by changing his residence to a lesser labor market is 
unfounded - the markets for Mr. Magee's employment as between his two 
residences are at least comparable. 
1 2000 Census gives the population of Cascade, Montana as 819. Census information obtained from 
internet. 
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In Claimant's Opening Brief, the case of Banzhaf v. Carnation Co., 
104 Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (Idaho 1983), was cited for the proposition that the 
doctrine of res judicata in not applicable in the application of I.C. §72-719(3). The 
statute overrides the concept of finality and permits the Industrial Commission to re-
open its earlier decision to correct a manifest injustice. The Defendant in its Brief is 
in agreement, " .... it is true that manifest injustice overrides the concept of finality of 
res judicata (see Banzhaf v. Carnation Co., 104 Idaho 700 (1983) ... " Nevertheless, 
Defendants have suggested to this Commission a legal doctrine which will give 
finality to an earlier decision of the Industrial Commission - namely the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. Defendants cite Brown v. State Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund, 138 Idaho 493, 65 P.3d 515. 518 (Idaho 2003). Chief Justice Trout, in 
Brown, set forth the difference in the application of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. " .... the distinction between res judicata as compared to collateral 
estoppel is that the former may not apply unless both individuals were parties to a 
previous judgment, while the latter may be used defensively against a party to the 
original proceeding when that original party litigated the relevant issue in the prior 
action. (Citation of Authority). Claimant was an original party to the settlement 
agreement with the employer/surety, but ISIF was not. Therefore, the issue the 
Commission should have considered is whether ISIF was entitled to assert 
collateral estoppel against Claimant." 
Therefore it is herein argued that since the identical parties are herein 
involved in this litigation and legal doctrine of res judicata is applicable and as 
stated in Banzhaf (supra) manifest injustice overrides the concept of the finality of 
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res judicata. In Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 29 P.3d 
401 (Idaho 2001), the Court therein stated, " .... although in the literal definition of the 
term res judicata is expansive enough to cover both preclusion or relitigation of the 
same cause of action and relitigation of the same issue, the modern tendency is to 
refer to the aspect of the doctrine that precludes relitigation of the same issue in a 
separate cause of action as collateral estoppel and to refer to that aspect preventing 
relitigation of the same cause of action as res judicata. In other words, the legal 
doctrine of res judicata covers both the preclusion of litigation of the same cause of 
action and the relitigation of the same issue and therefore in Banzhaf (supra), the 
Industrial Commission in resolution of manifest injustice is open to review its earlier 
decision irrespective of whether the reopening involves preclusion of relitigation or 
the preclusion of the religitation of the same issues. In other words, the hands of the 
Industrial Commission in the review of Mr. Magee's case are not tied by an 
application of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court's decision in Brown (supra) 
makes this clear. 
In the Referee's Findings of Fact No. 44 it is noted, "The legal 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to agency proceedings 
including those of the Industrial Commission. Citing Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 
128 Idaho 513, 516, 915 P.2d 1371, 1374 (1996), the Welch case involved an 
appeal from the Department of Employment. Therein the Court ruled, "There is no 
provision in the employment security law for the Commission to set aside a final 
order on its own motion. Section 72-719(3) of the Idaho Code to which the 
Commission referred, does not give it the authority to set aside a final decision 
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under the employment security law. Section 72-719(3) is part of Idaho's 
comprehensive workers' compensation law. There is no corresponding statute 
under Idaho's employment security law." 
The Referee in Finding of Fact No. 49 makes reference to Claimant's 
depression but notes, "There is no evidence that Claimant's physical limitations 
were impacted by his depression and/or that Claimant's depression impacted his 
disablement." This statement of the Referee however ignores the impact of Mr. 
Magee's chronic pain. Dr. Deming explained, "In my experience chronic unremitting 
pain results in a diminished capacity to sleep effectively to have the energy 
necessary to function on a day-by-day basis, and to enjoy life's experiences. At the 
time that I met with Mr. Magee those capacities were significantly compromised to 
the place that I believe he was incapacitated. With the relief of the - with the 
improvement of the pain function and counseling, Mr. Magee has improved pretty 
significantly. It is my judgment that his capacity is still compromised to an extent in 
that he can't work on a sustained basis, can't do the things that he has enjoyed in 
his life experience, his difficulty with sleep and energy those limitations, while 
improved, will continue into the foreseeable future .... it has been his report and my 
belief that he can maintain some level or work-related activity for three or four, even 
five hours at a time. But as is consistent with individuals with pain problems, his 
recovery time for that exertion is often times three, four, five days, and an increase 
in the use of medicine as well as an increase in the use of his neuro-stimulator 
treatment." Deming Depo. p. 8, L. 10 - p. 9, L.19. 
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It is respectfully contended that Finding of Fact No. 60 is contrary to 
the law. As stated above the legal doctrine of collateral estoppel does not prevent 
this Industrial Commission from reconsidering Mr. Magee's disability resulting from 
the subject industrial accident. In its Conclusions of Law the Industrial Commission 
has erred in concluding that benefits previously litigated are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. This Industrial Commission has further erred in its conclusion that 
its initial decision did not result in a manifest injustice that requires correction 
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-719(3). 
It is herein respectfully argued that upon review of this entire record, it 
is clear that Mr. Magee is a relatively uneducated person (eighth grade education); 
work history of heavy labor; an injury which has resulted in the suffering of chronic 
pain; and, advice from a vocational counselor that even in a large metropolitan labor 
market such as Helena, Montana, Mr. Magee is for all practical purposes 
unemployable an award of only twenty (20%) percent whole man disability is clearly 
inadequate. He should be awarded compensation for total and permanent 
disability. 
Respectfully submitted this -.LIL day of November, 2008. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for the Claimant herein requests oral argument of this Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 10, 2008, Claimant served the latest in a long line of 
motionsibriefing that continues to perpetuate a matter that the Industrial Commission, the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and these Defendants have been wrestling with since May of 2000. On the one 
hand, Defendants do, at least in part, applaud Claimant's dogged determination in his repeated 
attempts to procure additional benefits. On the other hand, there are no new stones to overturn, 
and Claimant's repeated efforts to re-hash the same evidentiary record, based upon the same 
accident, and involving the same parties, is both tiresome and impermissibly redundant. In their 
June 2008 Posthearing Brief, Defendants noted that Claimant has had so many bites at this same 
apple that there is nothing but a core left. Id. at 19. Now, Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration seeks to swallow the core. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Preliminary Notes 
First, it bears noting that Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion") 
consists of a blend of issues and record citations that blur the lines between matters stemming 
from the 2004 hearing proceedings and matters stemming from the 2007 hearing proceedings. 
To be clear, the proper scope of this Motion should be limited to matters raised and discussed in 
relation to Claimant's 2005 Complaint and the subsequent 2007 hearing proceedings, not matters 
raised and discussed in relation to Claimant's initial Complaint, and proceedings thereon, prior 
to 2005. All pre-2005 matters and issues were fully addressed and exhausted at the appellate 
level in Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 142 Idaho 761 (2006). Defendants are unaware 
of any authority permitting the Industrial Commission to reexamine, let alone overturn, holdings 
of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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Second, because Claimant's arguments remain largely repetitive and redundant, 
and given that they are based upon the same evidentiary record forming the foundation of 
Defendants' June 2008 Posthearing Brief, Defendants hereby adopt, and incorporate by reference 
herein, the entirety of their June 2008 Posthearing Brief. 
B. Issues Raised By Claimant 
While Claimant's Motion specifically takes issue with the Referee's Findings of 
Fact Nos. 44, 49, and 60 (see, Motion at pp. 11-13), the Motion does address argument to issues 
extending beyond the discrete Findings of Fact identified. So far as Defendants can discern, 
Claimant's Motion addresses the following issues: 
• The applicability, or the lack thereof, of the legal doctrine of res judicata 
(directly at issue in Findings of Fact Nos. 44 and 60); 
• Claimant's purported change in condition, and redress under Idaho Code 
Section 72-719(1)(a) (directly at issue in Finding of Fact No. 49); 
• Claimant's entitlement to total disability benefits in the form of disability 
beyond impairment, or in the alternative, total disability as an odd lot 
worker; and 
• The Commission's need to reexamine/reopen its prior decision(s) to 
rectify a purported manifest injustice under Idaho Code Section 72-719(3). 
Defendants will address each of these issues in tum herein. 
C. The Applicability Of Res Judicata And Idaho Code Section 72-718 
Much of Claimant's Motion is devoted to the argument that the legal doctrine of 
res judicata either does not apply to proceedings before the Industrial Commission at all, or that 
the doctrine does not apply to proceedings brought under Idaho Code Section 72-719. See, 
Motion at pp. 10-13. Claimant cites to Banzhafv. Carnation Co., 104 Idaho 700 (1983) in 
support of this position. While Defendants agree that true res judicata (claim preclusion) is 
overridden by a finding of manifest injustice, should such a finding be made, collateral estoppel 
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does properly apply to Commission proceedings, and does bar Claimant's repeated attempts to 
relitigate identical issues with subsequently enhanced evidence. 
1. Banzhaf Does Not Bar The Applicability Of Collateral Estoppel To 
Commission Proceedings 
As Defendants have briefed previously, the legal doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel apply to agency proceedings, including those of the Industrial Commission. 
See, e.g., Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513, 516 (1996) and Brown v. State, 138 Idaho 
493, 496-97 (2003). Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94 (2002). Under the 
principles of claim preclusion (or true res judicata), a valid final judgment rendered on the merits 
by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same 
parties upon the same claim. Id. (citations omitted). The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not 
only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also serves as an absolute bar to 
claims relating to the same cause of action which might have been made. Id. (citations omitted). 
Stated differently, res judicata bars relitigation of matters already raised, and those that could or 
should have been raised from the outset. Id., see also, us. Bank National Ass 'n v. Kuenzli, 134 
Idaho 222 (2000). The doctrine of res judicata extinguishes all claims arising out of the same 
transaction, or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose. Us. Bank National 
Ass 'n, 134 Idaho at 226. 
Regarding the separate, but related, concept of collateral estoppel, issue 
preclusion bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated in prior litigation between the very 
same parties. Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90 (2001). Five factors must 
be evident in order for collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior 
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proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior 
litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be 
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the 
merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or 
in privity with a party to the litigation. Id. at 93 (citations omitted). 
Claimant latches onto authority that seemingly lumps the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel together with the doctrine of true res judicata under the broader, generic heading of res 
judicata. See, e.g., Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94 (2002); see also, Motion at p. 11 ("In 
other words, the doctrine of res judicata covers both the preclusion of litigation of the same 
cause of action [true res judicata] and the relitigation of the same issue [collateral 
estoppel] ... "). Consequently, Claimant argues that Banzhaf's rejection of the finality of res 
judicata applies equally to bar the applicability of both true res judicata and collateral estoppel 
given collateral estoppel's inclusion under the broader umbrella of res judicata. See, Motion at 
p. 11 (Given the holding of Banzhaf, and given that the doctrine of res judicata covers both true 
res judicata and collateral estoppel, "the hands of the Industrial Commission in the review of Mr. 
Magee's case are not tied by an application of collateral estoppel."). Defendants disagree with 
Claimant's argument for the following reasons. 
First, there is no question that the legal doctrine of res judicata applies in 
Commission proceedings. See, e.g., Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 115 Idaho 1132 
(1989) ("We hold that prior decisions of the Department of Employment and the Industrial 
Commission ... are res judicata as to the claim for unemployment benefits."); and Welch v. Del 
Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513, 516 (1996) ("This Court has also applied the doctrine of res 
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judicata to unemployment-insurance decisions of the Department of Employment and the 
Industrial Commission."). Both cases post-date the 1983 Banzhaf decision by six and thirteen 
years, respectively. Thus, to the extent that Claimant contends that the doctrine of res judicata 
has no bearing in Commission proceedings in light of Banzhaf, that contention is misguided 
given the subsequent decisions of Madsen and Welch, supra. 
Second, though various legal authorities suggest otherwise, res judicata and 
collateral estoppel are two distinctly separate legal doctrines that operate independently of one 
another. See, e.g., Western Indus. v. Kaldveer Associates, 126 Idaho 541, 543 (1994) (" ... the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel . . . have decidedly different applications."); 
Rodriguez v. Dept. o/Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92 (2001) ("Although the literal definition of the 
term 'res judicata' is expansive enough to cover both preclusion of relitigation of the same cause 
of action and relitigation of the same issue, the modem tendency is to refer to the aspect of the 
doctrine that precludes relitigation of the same issue in a separate cause of action as 'collateral 
estoppel' .... "); and Ticor Title v. Stanion, 114 Idaho 119, 123 (2007) ("Separate tests are used 
to determine whether claim preclusion [true res judicata] or issue preclusion [collateral estoppel] 
applies."). Consequently, Claimant's attempts to lump the separate, but related, doctrine of 
collateral estoppel together with the doctrine res judicata in an effort to preclude the application 
of collateral estoppel through the use of Banzhaf are misguided for the simple reason that the two 
legal doctrines are not one and the same. 
Third, Claimant's argument reqUlres the Commission to ignore Idaho Code 
Section 72-718-a statute that expressly codifies and applies the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
within Idaho's worker's compensation statutes. Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716 
(1984), and Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3 (1995) confirm this codification and application. 
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Further, Brown v. State, 138 Idaho 493 (2003) specifically states that Industrial Commission 
should apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel when the facts of a matter warrant the doctrine's 
application. Id. at 496-97. Like Madsen and Welch, supra, Woodvine, Sund, and Brown all 
post-date the 1983 BanzhaJdecision. 
Given the clear applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel when the facts 
of a matter so warrant, the Referee and the Commission acted properly in deciding that 
Claimant's claims regarding: (1) additional/ongoing medical care; (2) additional PPI benefits; 
(3) disability in excess of impairment; and (4) odd lot worker were so barred in relation to 
the 2005 Complaint and the subsequent 2007 hearing. This is because: (1) Claimant had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issues decided in the earlier (2004 hearing) case; (2) the issues 
decided in the prior litigation were identical to the issues presented in the present (2007 hearing) 
action; (3) the issues sought to be precluded were actually decided in the prior litigation; 
(4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the Defendants against 
whom the issue is asserted were parties to the prior litigation. 
Each of the foregoing issues presented for consideration in this matter was not 
only litigated before the Commission in 2004, but was also litigated before the Idaho Supreme 
Court in 2005. See, Industrial Commission Hearing Transcript, dated March 17, 2004 at 4-7; 
Claimant's Opening Brief, dated June 28, 2004; Defendants' Posthearing Brief, dated 
July 19, 2004; Claimant's Reply Brief, dated August 4, 2004; Industrial Commission's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation & Order, dated October 15, 2004; 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration, dated November 3, 2004; Industrial Commission's 
Order Denying Reconsideration, dated December 3, 2004; Claimant's Notice of Appeal, dated 
January 12, 2005; Appellant's Opening Brief, dated June 9, 2005; Respondents' Brief, dated 
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July 25, 2005; and the decision Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 142 Idaho 761 (2006). 
There is no question that issues raised in this matter are identical to those raised before, that the 
issues were fully decided both by the Industrial Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court, that 
the parties are exactly the same throughout this litany of proceedings, and that Claimant has had 
more than a full and fair opportunity to litigate the aforementioned issues. These Defendants 
again assert that if the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the express, unambiguous language of 
Idaho Code Section 72-718 mean anything at all, Claimant's claims and his Motion must be 
rejected and barred. The application ofIdaho Code Section 72-719 and the BanzhaJdecision do 
not change this necessary result. The Defendants are entitled to some finality in this matter. 
D. If Claimant's Physical Condition Has Changed, It Has Changed For The 
Better 
Claimant contends that the Referee "ignore[d] the impact ofMr. Magee's chronic 
pain" when he concluded that there is no evidence that Claimant's physical limitations were 
impacted by his depression and/or that Claimant's depression impacted his disablement. Motion 
at p. 12. It is clear that Claimant bears the burden of not only showing a compensable change in 
condition, but also that the change in condition is causally related to the subject accident and 
injury. Matthews v. Department oj Corrections, 121 Idaho 680, 681-82 (1992). What is not 
clear, is how Claimant believes that his condition has changed for the worse, particularly when 
the record demonstrates that, if anything, Claimant's condition has improved substantially. 
With apologies to the Commission, Defendants simply reiterate the arguments 
made in their June 2008 Posthearing Brief at Section IV.B.2. The Record of this matter is replete 
with statements from various sources, including Claimant himself, that his physical condition 
remains unchanged as between 2004 and today; that his occupational capacity remains 
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light/sedentary (the same as it was in 2004); and that Claimant's physical condition has improved 
as the result of Dr. Frizzell's implantation of the spinal stimulator-a device that has greatly 
reduced his dependence upon pain medications and his self-professed suffering of 
medication-related adverse side effects. For example, Claimant stated that: (1) the type and 
location of pain from which he suffers remains unchanged from that in 2004 (Tr. at 12:14-24; 
41:3-14); (2) that he had a previous lumbar spine surgery in 1983 to address the same pain 
pattern that he now experiences as a result of his May 2000 industrial accident (Tr. 
at 41:25-43:10); (3) that he is unaware of any physician rating him with any additional PPI than 
that already awarded in 2004 (Tr. at 43: 11-19); (4) that he faces the same occupational 
limitations (light/sedentary) now as he did in 2004 (Tr. at 43:20-44:7); and (5) that the spinal 
stimulator has proven beneficial by increasing his activity levels and by decreasing the amount of 
pain medication he ingests by at least half (Tr. at 14:21-23; 16:21-17: 1; and 33:9-17). 
Claimant's own statements have been further substantiated Dr. Kurtz and Dr. 
Frizzell, and Douglas Crum. Dr. Kurtz testified that Claimant's condition remains "basically 
unchanged," and that, if anything, the spinal stimulator implant has improved Claimant's 
physical condition-chiefly by reducing Claimant's reliance on his pain medications. Kurtz 
Depo. at 19: 18-20:6. The spinal stimulator has resulted in an office visit decline from every 
other week down to only once per month. ld. at 20:7-21: 1. Dr. Frizzell testified that Claimant 
has done much "better than most," and that Claimant is undergoing a "very consistent and 
prolonged satisfactory course." Frizzell Depo. at 9:20-10:5; 15:4-12. This has led to a 65% 
reduction in Claimant's radicular symptoms, thereby similarly reducing Claimant's reliance upon 
pain medication. ld. Occupationally, Dr. Frizzell noted that with use of the spinal stimulator, 
Claimant is capable of slightly beyond what would be considered light/sedentary work. ld. 
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at 12:5-12. Mr. Crum testified Claimant is capable of light/sedentary work, and maybe some 
work a little more strenuous than that based upon the testimony of Dr. FrizzelL Crum 
Depo. at 17:18-18:4. Mr. Crum also confirmed that, if anything, Claimant's physical condition 
and employment capabilities have improved since the implantation of his spinal stimulator, and 
that Claimant is no less employable now than he was in 2004--namely, capable of 
light/sedentary employment. Id. at 25:25-26:5. Thus, and according to the direct testimony of 
Drs. Kurtz and Frizzell, that of Mr. Crum, and that of Claimant himself, Claimant is no worse off 
than he was in 2004, and that in many respects, his condition has actually improved. Defendants 
fail to note how Claimant has met his burden of showing an increased level of impairment based 
upon this record. 
The only change in condition that Claimant has established through competent 
evidence is a temporary decline in his psychological health manifested by the onset of clinical 
depression. This "change in condition" is nothing more than a red herring. First, there is no 
evidence that this mental condition has led to any decrease in Claimant's physical capabilities. 
Second, the "condition" is no longer a hindrance given its satisfactory control through the use of 
prescription anti-depressants and counseling paid for by the Defendants. Third, the portions of 
Dr. Deming's deposition cited by Claimant in support of his purported change in condition 
establish that both his mental and physical conditions have improved, as opposed to worsened. 
For example, Dr. Deming testified that in his experience, those afflicted with chronic and 
unremitting pain suffer from a diminished capacity to sleep effectively and, therefore, lack the 
energy to function on a day-to-day basis. Deming Depo. at 8:10-25. When Dr. Deming first met 
with Claimant, he believed that Claimant was similarly afflicted, so much so that Dr. Deming 
considered Claimant to be incapacitated. ld. However, in the very next sentence, and in the very 
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same breath, Dr. Deming also acknowledged that given the improvement of Claimant's pain 
(presumably through the implantation of the spinal stimulator) and his continued counseling, 
Claimant had "improved pretty significantly." Id. Moreover, Dr. Deming's ultimate conclusion 
is that Claimant "can maintain some level of work-related activity for three or four, or even five 
hours at a time" in his present condition. Id. at 9: 11-14. Just as in June 2008, Defendants are at 
a loss as to how this record establishes that Claimant has sustained an adverse change in 
condition. 
E. Claimant Has Failed To Meet His Burdens In Establishing Either Total 
Disability Of Odd Lot Status 
Nothing in Claimant's Motion rebuts the Defendants' prior arguments that his 
current employability remains unchanged as compared to that in 2004. Instead, Claimant's 
Motion rehashes a variety of vocational testimony offered at the 2004 and 2007 hearings of this 
matter. At most, Claimant's Motion asserts that the Referee either misunderstood or 
mischaracterized the testimony of Douglas Crum. Motion at p. 9. While it is unclear as to what, 
exactly, Claimant is attempting to argue with respect to the labor market differences or 
similarities between Cascade and Radersburg, Montana (Claimant's residence at the time of the 
accident and his current residence, respectively), what is clear is that it is Claimant's burden to 
prove that he is totally disabled. See, e.g., Seese v. Ideal of Idaho, Inc., 110 Idaho 32, 34 (1986) 
and Lyons v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403 (1977). 
Dr. Frizzell and Mr. Crum directly stated that Claimant is at least capable of 
light/sedentary employment. Drs. Kurtz and Deming both acknowledge that Claimant is capable 
of at least some work (such as some manual labor/yard work or other routine maintenance work 
according to Dr. Kurtz, and some level of work-related activity for up to a five (5) hour period 
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according to Dr. Deming). The facts of the matter are that Claimant voluntarily removed himself 
from his employment as a potato truck driver, as a livestock penner, and, most recently, as a 
potato sorter; not one single physician ever issued a note taking Claimant off of these jobs. 
While the jobs have sUbjectively proven uncomfortable to Claimant, or have caused him concern 
due to the self-described side effects of his medication, Claimant proved to be quite adept at 
finding these jobs, and could be just as adept at finding light/sedentary jobs. There is no 
evidence that Claimant has ever approached his former employers regarding any light/sedentary 
job opportunities that might exist, or whether he might be able to work on a part-time basis that 
suits his needs. Claimant conceded that he has never registered with a job service. To the extent 
that light/sedentary employment is not available in the vicinity of Radersburg, Montana, it was 
the voluntary choice of Claimant to move to such a desolate area. For all intents and purposes, it 
was Claimant, and not any of his treating physicians, that removed himself from the labor market 
by (1) quitting his other jobs, and (2) moving to such a small town. Mr. Crum acknowledged 
that even though Claimant would still experience some difficulty, residence in a larger 
population center would afford him greater employment opportunity. Mr. Crum certainly has 
not said that Claimant is unemployable. Some employment opportunity, even with some 
difficulty, is not no opportunity, even in Montana. 
Further, and regarding Claimant's access to larger area job markets, it should be 
noted that Claimant's current residence, Radersburg, Montana, is located nearly in the middle of 
a highway-linked triangle formed by the communities of Helena (population 25,700), Bozeman 
(population 27,500), and Butte (population 34,600), Montana. Radersburg is 54 miles from 
Helena, 63 miles from Bozeman, and 80 miles from Butte. These communities alone account for 
a population of approximately 87,800 regardless of the smaller communities scattered in 
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between. Though Claimant's Motion either erroneously or disingenuously states otherwise (see, 
Motion at pp. 7-9), Mr. Crum's vocational analysis was restricted to the immediate vicinity of 
Radersburg (including Townsend), Montana. It did not extend to or include any of Helena, 
Bozeman, or Butte. At most, Mr. Crum's testimony only makes passing reference to these 
communities. Crum Depo. at 18:5-24:5; 29:8-21. 
To put Claimant's access to these much larger labor markets in perspective, 
Claimant would routinely drive upwards of 100 miles roundtrip to consult with Dr. Kurtz. 
Finding of Fact No. 25. Moreover, Claimant himself testified that he could work in either 
Bozeman or Helena, but that he has not attempted such a search because he, himself, knows of 
no work in those communities that he could do. Finding of Fact No. 17. Defendants cannot 
ascertain why Mr. Crum did not expressly analyze Claimant's potential employability in Helena, 
Bozeman, or Butte given Claimant's self-processed accessibility to those labor markets. All that 
Defendants can say is that Mr. Crum opined that a larger labor market would afford Claimant 
greater employment opportunity; Claimant has access to these markets; and just because 
Claimant subjectively feels he could not secure employment in these larger and reachable 
markets does not make it so. Likewise, Defendants cannot ascertain why Mr. Crum did not 
quantify any purported loss of labor market access or potential diminution in wages. Instead, 
and with respect to Claimant's physical condition and employment capabilities, Mr. Crum 
ultimately and expressly confirmed that Claimant's physical condition has improved since the 
implantation of his spinal stimulator, and that Claimant is no less employable now than he was in 
2004--narnely that Claimant remains capable of light/sedentary employment. Crum Depo. at 
25:25-26:5. 
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F. The Commission May Review A Matter For Manifest Injustice, It Is Not 
Required To Do So 
In addition to arguing change III condition under Idaho Code 
Section 72-719(1)( a), Claimant also argues that the Commission must reopen its decision 
regarding the benefits awarded to date in order to rectify a manifest injustice according to Idaho 
Code Section 72-719(3). What Claimant's argument really boils down to is an attempt to 
enhance the underlying record with evidence that should have been presented in 2004, and an 
attempt to relitigate matters already decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2006. Having 
already run the full gamut of the appellate process, this matter could not be any more final 
procedurally. Yet the Defendants find themselves responding to Claimant's latest Motion which 
continues to litigate the very same issues. 
While the Referee is correct to point out in Finding of Fact No. 54 that the 
Commission may review any order to correct manifest injustice, even when that purported 
manifest injustice is brought to the Commission's attention by either party or a third party, that 
does not change the facts that: (1) the Commission may do so only on "its own motion," and 
(2) the Commission's authority in reviewing orders under the manifest injustice standard is 
discretionary, not mandatory. See, I.C. § 72-719(3); see also, Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 
Idaho 302 (2008) ("The Commission may review any order to correct a manifest injustice.") 
(emphasis added), and Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 117 Idaho 790, 792-93 (1988). Admittedly, the 
, 
manifest injustice standard should be construed broadly. Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 13 (1982). 
However, the review remains discretionary, and Defendants are at a loss as to what injustice 
Claimant can complain of given that he has been afforded more than a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate this matter for nearly a decade, and in multiple forums. Just because the Commission 
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"may" reopen an order to correct a manifest injustice does not mean it has to. Moreover, it needs 
to find a manifest injustice to correct in the first place. 
Claimant's condition has not worsened. If anything, the record repeatedly 
demonstrates that Claimant's condition has improved. Claimant also fully acknowledges that 
these Defendants have continually paid for all of his requisite medical treatment as required by 
the Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court. Put simply, Claimant's continuing litigation of 
this matter amounts to nothing more than repeated attempts to redress evidentiary deficiencies 
that have been pointed out by the Commission, the Idaho Supreme Court, and these Defendants 
over the past eight years. To the extent that Claimant failed to meet his evidentiary burdens, that 
failure is Claimant's and Claimant's alone. None of the Commission, the Idaho Supreme Court, 
or these Defendants interfered with Claimant's opportunity and ability to properly and 
comprehensively work up and present his case. It is fundamentally improper and grossly unfair 
to allow Claimant to relitigate the same issues with enhanced evidence. Moreover, even the 
enhanced evidence, particularly the testimony of Douglas Crum, is deficient for the reasons 
discussed in Section II.E, above. Though bluntly stated, it 1S time for Claimant and everyone 
else involved to get off of the merry-go-round and to move on. It simply cannot be said that 
Claimant has not enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Commission deny 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration in its entirety. Claimant's condition has improved, and 
there is simply no manifest injustice to address. 
DATED this 2 (." day of November, 2008, 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
enna M. Christensen - Of the Firm 
By~~~~~ ______________ __ 
A d ew J. Waldera - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this :z? day of November, 2008, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Emil F. Pike, Jr. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Facsimile 208/734-9930 
Attorney for Claimant 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
V, J. MAGEE, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING ) 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
Employer, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
Defendants. ) 
---------------------------) 
I.C. No. 00·020426 
MOTION FOR ORAL 
ARGUMENT 
COMES NOW Emil F. Pike, Jr., attorney for Claiman1, V. J. Magee, 
and herein requests of this Industrial Commission that it set a time for the Oral 
Argument for Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration. This Motion is made for the 
reason that the pending decision of this Industrial Commission involves serious 
Motion for Oral Argument-1 
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issues of both fact and law that need amplification to this Commission by the 
opportunity of Oral Argument. 
DATED this .23 day of January, 2009. 
mil F. Pike, J . f / 
Attorney for Claimant ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 'I ~ay of January, 2009, I served a copy of the foregoing document, 
by depositingOa TfUe copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, upon 
the following: 
Glenna M. Christensen 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, 10 83701 
Motion for Oral Argument- 2 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
V.J.MAGEE, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
v. ) IC 2000-020426 
) 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING COMPANY, ) 
) 
Employer, ) ORDER DENYING 
) RECONSIDERATION 
and ) 
) 
ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) 
) FILED 
Surety, ) FEB 182009 
) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Defendants. ) 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, Claimant moves for reconsideration of the 
Commission's October 21, 2008 decision in the above-referenced case. Claimant objects to the 
Commission's finding that he has failed to establish a change of condition pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-719(1)(a). Claimant further objects to the Commission's finding that application of 
the Commission's October 15, 2004 decision in this case would not result in manifest injustice. 
Finally, Claimant objects to the Commission's finding that several issues, which were previously 
litigated upon and decided in the 2004 decision, are barred from further consideration under the 
doctrine of res judicata. Claimant asks for oral argument on his motion for reconsideration. 
Defendants reply that Claimant's motion is essentially a request to re-weigh evidence and 
arguments already considered and ruled upon by the Commission. Defendants ask the 
Commission to deny Claimant's motion. 
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The Commission agrees with Defendants that Claimant's arguments on these issues have 
already been considered. The Commission carefully examined and weighed all evidence and 
arguments before rendering the October 21, 2008 decision and remains unpersuaded by 
Claimant's arguments. 
Accordingly, Claimant's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Claimant's 
motion for oral argument is also DENIED. 
DATED this /!~ of February, 2009. 
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I hereby certify that on the /I-1;;y of February, 2009 a true and correct copy of Order 
Denying Reconsideration was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
EMIL F PIKE JR 
POBOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
GLENNA M CHRISTENSEN 
PO BOX 829 
BOISE ID 83701-0829 
eb/cjh 
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EMIL F. PIKE, JR. 
ATIORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.o.BOX302 
Twin FaDs, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: 208/734-9960 
Fax Number: 208/734-9960 
Idaho State Bar No. 974 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
V. J. MAGEE, ) I.C. No. 00-020426 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
Employer, ) 
) 
and ) 'l ... A.) 
) 
ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
Defendants. ) 
------------------------------) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, Thompson Creek Mining 
Company and Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Cmpany, and their counsel 
of record, Glenna M. Christensen of the firm of MOffatt, Thomas, Barrett, 
Rock and Fields, Chartered, P.O. Box 829, Boise, 10 83701 and the CLERK 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, V. J. Magee , appeals 
against the above-named Respondents to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Idaho from the Findings of Fact, 
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Conclusions of Law, and Order entered on October 21, 
2008; and, from the Order Denying Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration entered on February 18, 2009; 
Chairman R. D. Maynard, presiding. 
2. That Claimant has a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the judgments or orders described 
in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 11(d), Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which 
the Appellant intends to assert in the appeal, but which 
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other 
issues on appeal, are as follows: 
That the Industrial Commission erred in concluding 
that an injured workman may not be awarded 
additional workers' compensation benefits under the 
theory of manifest injustice, Idaho Code §72-719(3) 
becaue of the application of res judicata .. 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any 
portion of the record. 
5. Appellant requests the preparation of the following 
portions of the reporter's transcript, inclusive of: 
(a) The evidence presented at the time of hearing, 
including the testimony of all witnesses; 
Notice of Appeal - 2 
(b) Documentary evidence presented, inclusive of 
Rule 10 documents used by the Industrial 
Commission in its previous hearing held on 
March 17, 2004; and, 
(c) Copies of all deposition transcript used by the 
Industrial Commission at its hearing on March 
17,2004, and used by the Industrial Commission 
to render its Opinion of October 21, 2008 .. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That the estimated fee for preparation of the 
Clerk's Record/Reporter's Transcript has been 
paid in the requested amount of $100.00; 
(b) That the Appellant's filing fee has been paid in the 
amount of $86.00; 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties 
required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 30th day of March, 2009. 
j 
,_ ,I L 
Emil F. Pike, Jr. 
Attorney for Claima t 
" 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 30th day of March, 2009, I served a copy of the foregoing document, by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the 
following: 
Glenna M. Christensen 
MOFFAD, THOMAS, BARRED, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, 10 83701 
Emil F. Pike, jr. " / 
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, IAPR-2M~] Defendants/Respondents. 
Appeal From: 
Case Number: 
Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondents: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
) 
) 
I St 'P'Tl~ Court __ Court <¥-.Aftleais _. 
I _", 'Co" 'r "TS t;vUQ. 
Industrial COmmlsslon;--Chairman, R.'n. Maynard, 
presiding. 
IC 2000-020426 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation, filed October 21, 2008; and Order, 
filed October 21, 2008, and Order Denying 
Reconsideration, filed February 18, 2009. 
Emil F. Pike, J r. 
Glenna Christensen 
Claimant/Appellant 
DefendantslRespondents 
March 31, 2009 
$86.00 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - MAGEE - 1 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
M & M Court Reporting 
Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript has 
been prepared and filed with the Commission. 
April 1, 2009 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - MAGEE - 2 
CERTIFICATION 
'. 
I, Gina Espinosa, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy ofthe Notice of Appeal, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, 
and Order, and Order Denying Reconsideration, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 
2000-020426 for V. J. Magee. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of said 
Commission this 1 st day of April, 2009. 
CERTIFICATION - Magee, S. C. # ~03S-~ -1 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Gina Espinosa, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court 
No. 36352 on appeal by Rule 28(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly 
listed in the Certificate of Exhibits (i). Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon 
settlement of the Reporter's Transcript and Record herein. 
DATED this 10th day of June, 2009. 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
V.J.MAGEE, 
Claimant/Appellant, 
v. 
) 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 36352 
) 
) 
THOMPSON CREEK MINING ) NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
COMP ANY, Employer, and ACE FIRE 
~ER~TERSTINS~CE 
COMPANY, Surety, 
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) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
TO: STEPHEN W KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and 
Emil F. Pike, Jr., for the Appellant; and 
Glenna M. Christensen, for the Respondents. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been served 
by regular U.S. mail upon each ofthe following: 
EMIL F PIKE JR 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
GLENNA M CHRISTENSEN 
POBOX 829 
BOISE ID 83701-0829 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the Record, 
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no obj ections to the Agency's 
Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Transcript and Record shall be deemed 
settled. 
DATED this 10th day of June, 2009. 
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